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INTRA-AGENCY COORDINATION 
 
Jennifer Nou∗ 
 
 
Administrative law scholarship has increasingly focused on the ways in 
which Congress and the President coordinate the interactions of multiple 
agencies.  Common motivating questions include how political principals 
should manage interagency relationships according to various normative 
criteria, such as efficiency or accountability.  Few commentators, however, 
have pursued analogous inquiries about the internal structures and pro-
cesses for drafting regulations within an agency.  Despite the overlapping 
duties of staff members, there is little systematic analysis about how agen-
cy heads manage intra-agency — as opposed to interagency — coordina-
tion.  As a result, the agency head has been neglected as an important de-
terminant of institutional design. 
 
This Article seeks to provide a general account of how agency heads, 
distinct from political principals like Congress or the President, direct and 
operate their organizational divisions.  More specifically, the analysis pre-
sents a theory of how bureaucratic leaders use internal structures and pro-
cedures to process information and reduce informational asymmetries in 
light of their individual preferences and exogenous uncertainties.  In doing 
so, this Article offers a conceptual framework to analyze agency institu-
tional design problems as well as to explain variations in bureaucratic 
form.  Armed with these insights, the analysis then considers some norma-
tive tradeoffs among the contemplated coordination tools, including the 
implications for political and judicial oversight.  It concludes by suggest-
ing various reforms such as the judicially-enforceable disclosure of inter-
nal agency processes, as well as doctrines designed to foster accountabil-
ity and protect agency expertise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Observers of the rulemaking process have long recognized the salience 
of bureaucratic structure to regulatory outcomes.  Organizational design 
choices can determine who controls the levers of influence, both formal 
and informal, within an administrative agency.1  In one prominent view, 
 1 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY 7 (1980) (“Organizational 
arrangements have much to do with determining how power is distributed among participants in the 
decision-making process, the manner in which information is gathered, the types of data that are 
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Congress can “stack the deck”2 through structures and processes designed 
to ensure that certain constituents continue to influence regulatory policy.3  
For example, a statute could strategically define an agency’s jurisdiction, 
impose for-cause removal restrictions on its officials, or limit the availabil-
ity of judicial review — all in efforts to preserve the interests of the win-
ning legislative coalition.4  Other scholars have developed analogous theo-
ries of presidential bureaucratic design as well.5  From this perspective, the 
structural determinants of regulatory policy are “more the product of poli-
tics than of any rational or overarching plan for effective administration.”6 
This general lens is in keeping with administrative law’s overwhelming 
focus on the influence of agencies’ external monitors.  The main unit of 
analysis from this point of view is the agency, and the central question is 
how actors outside of that agency exercise control over it.  Comparatively 
lacking, however, is work assessing controls internal to the agency: how 
these mechanisms arise, what explains their design, and how agency heads 
can shape and implement them.  Consequently, what the structure-and-
process account still requires is an examination of how agency heads 
themselves can and do impose mechanisms to further their own interests.7  
These intra-agency units of analysis have many different names in the real 
world: “divisions,” “bureaus,” “centers,” and “offices,” to name a few.8  
collected, the kinds of policy issues that are discussed, the choices that are made, and the ways in 
which decisions are implemented.”); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE 
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267, 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989) (“The bureaucracy 
arises out of politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who 
exercise political power.”).  
 2 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444 
(1989) (emphasis omitted). 
 3 See id.; Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); see also David B. Spence, 
Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 
(1999) (explaining political attempts to influence policy choices of regulatory agencies). 
 4 Other statutory possibilities include granting certain interest groups access to an agency’s 
decisionmaking process, determining terms of office and salary levels, or promoting interagency 
competition.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99–108 (1992). 
 5 See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN (2003); Terry 
M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1994, at 1, 13–15. 
 6 LEWIS, supra note 5, at 2. 
 7 Cf. Glen O. Robinson, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control 
of Agencies”: Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 488–89 (1989) (critiquing 
the congressional structure-and-process account as incomplete given that “[i]nternal structural 
arrangements for [major] agencies are within the prerogative of the agency or, in appropriate cases, the 
executive department in which it resides,” id. at 488). 
 8 For example, the Office of the General Counsel and the Center for Faith-Based and 
Neighborhood Partnerships within the Department of Health and Human Services, see HHS 
Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies 
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What unites them analytically here is that they constitute organizational 
units of analysis within agencies, which possess governmental authority.9 
Just as in the interagency context, which has generated a substantial 
amount of recent scholarship,10 many of these internal agency divisions 
have intersecting duties when it comes to regulatory development.  Alter-
natively, these units can perform independent substantive functions.  These 
dynamics analogously require what this Article calls intra-agency coordi-
nation.  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), for exam-
ple, assigns the oversight of regulatory cost-benefit analyses to both its Of-
fice of the Chief Economist and its Office of General Counsel.11  At the 
same time, staff members across the CFTC’s various divisions — whether 
in the Division of Market Oversight or the Division of Clearing and Risk 
— are responsible for drafting these analyses.12  To better manage these 
/orgchart/index.html (last updated July 17, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8Y2F-NMWS], the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs within the Department of 
Labor, see Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol 
/aboutdol/orgchart.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4SW5-52TF], and the Division of 
Enforcement and Division of Economic and Risk Analysis at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
see Divisions and Offices, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov 
/divisions.shtml (last updated Sept. 12, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4U7S-RTR8]. 
 9 One way to think about the subagency is relative to the Administrative Procedure Act’s own 
definition of an “agency” in these terms.  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (defining “agency” as “each 
authority of the Government . . . whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but 
does not include — (A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the 
territories or possessions of the United States; [or] (D) the government of the District of Columbia”). 
 10 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1103–04 
(2013); Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 750–54 (2011); 
Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1131, 1139–41 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative 
Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: 
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 (2014); Jason Marisam, 
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 
45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015). 
 11 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, A 
REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN PURSUANT TO THE DODD-
FRANK ACT i–iii (2011), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public 
/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_investigation_061311.pdf [http://perma.cc/S9MV-485D].  
 12 See id. at ii.  The Inspector General’s report refers to the CFTC’s “Division of Clearing and 
Intermediary Oversight” and relays that a “team member” in this division prepared the “draft cost-
benefit analysis.”  Id. at 17.  Since the report’s publication, however, the CFTC commissioners have 
reorganized the CFTC such that the “Division of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight” has now “been 
reconfigured into two new divisions: the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight and the 
Division of Clearing and Risk” — indeed an example of intra-agency coordination.  Reassignment of 
Commission Staff Responsibilities and Delegations of Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 22418, 22418 (Apr. 16, 
2013). 
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overlapping dynamics, the commissioners of the CFTC have engaged in 
various restructurings and procedural reforms in recent years.13 
Intra-agency coordination mechanisms can also serve as instruments of 
control in the presence of information asymmetries.  Such tools may be 
used by agency heads to discipline appointed subordinates or resistant ca-
reer staff.  Consider, for example, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator Christine Todd Whitman’s efforts to transfer the Agency’s 
Ombudsman from the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to 
another internal office, the Office of the Inspector General.14  The stated 
purpose of the reorganization was “to improve the effectiveness of [the 
Ombudsman] program by giving the Ombudsmen and those who may con-
tact them a clear and consistent set of operating policies and expecta-
tions.”15  Critics of the proposal, however — most vocally, the sitting Om-
budsman — accused Whitman of attempting to effectively “dissolv[e]” the 
Ombudsman’s position.16  On this account, by subordinating the Ombuds-
man role to the authority of the Inspector General, the Ombudsman would 
in practice be left without independent internal authority.17  Despite oppo-
sition from some members of Congress and ultimately unsuccessful litiga-
tion by the Ombudsman himself,18 Whitman nevertheless implemented the 
reorganization plan, resulting in the Ombudsman’s eventual resignation.19 
Changes in the external monitoring environment can also prompt re-
newed coordination efforts, though they invariably leave room for institu-
tional discretion.  Agency heads can thus exercise a form of “residual deci-
sion rights,” or rights “actor[s] may possess under a . . . governing 
arrangement that allow [them] to take unilateral action at [their] own dis-
 13 See id. at i–iii; see also Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, Note, A Tale of Two 
Commissions: A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 
32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 638–39 (2013) (discussing the ways in which the CFTC has 
“undergone structural reorganizations in its rulemaking teams to improve the efficacy of cost-benefit 
analysis”).  
 14 See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Whitman Announces Reorganization of EPA Ombudsman 
Office, EPA 01-R-234 (Nov. 27, 2001), 2001 WL 1498204; Mark Hertsgaard, Conflict of Interest for 
Christine Todd Whitman?, SALON (Jan. 14, 2002, 7:47 PM), http://www.salon.com 
/2002/01/15/whitman_5 [http://perma.cc/JB35-WFUV].  
 15 Draft Guidance for National Hazardous Waste Ombudsman and Regional Superfund Ombudsmen 
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 365 (Jan. 3, 2001). 
 16 Edward Walsh, EPA to Transfer Ombudsman, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/29/epa-to-transfer-ombudsman/8dae42fa-a252-447b-
9237-d60bb36c54a5/ [http://perma.cc/NG52-NUQW] (quoting a memo from the Ombudsman). 
 17 Id. (quoting the Ombudsman’s view that “the [Inspector General] is taking over my 
cases . . . . They’re going to be doing my job”). 
 18 See Hertsgaard, supra note 14; Robert McClure & Paul Shukovsky, Watchdog Quits EPA: 
Silenced, He Says, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 22, 2002, 10:00 PM), http://www 
.seattlepi.com/news/article/Watchdog-quits-EPA-Silenced-he-says-1085783.php [http://perma.cc/S6BK-
F9SA]. 
 19 See McClure & Shukovsky, supra note 18.  
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cretion when the formal agreement is ambiguous or silent about precisely 
what behaviors are required.”20  For example, the D.C. Circuit recently 
struck down the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) shareholder 
proxy rule on the basis of an insufficient cost-benefit analysis.21  As a re-
sult, the SEC Commissioners granted the agency’s Chief Economist the 
authority to review and sign off on future regulations’ cost-benefit anal-
yses.22  To further augment the agency’s economic capacity, the Commis-
sioners also bolstered the number of economists in the SEC’s Division of 
Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation (now known as the Division of 
Economic and Risk Analysis) as well as enhanced the entity’s role in the 
regulatory drafting process.23 
Executive agency heads have also engaged in organizational design — 
not only as a reaction to judicial oversight, but also as a response to presi-
dential initiatives.  For instance, after President Ronald Reagan issued an 
executive order requiring agencies to submit major regulations for review, 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
published a new rule in the Federal Register.24  The rule’s stated purpose 
was to “revis[e] . . . the Department’s regulations development processes 
to assure consistency with the objectives of the President’s regulatory relief 
program in all of the Department’s regulatory actions.”25  Specifically, 
while HHS had previously exempted the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) from its internal review process, it now subjected all “FDA regula-
tions involving significant public policy” to HHS secretary-level review 
and approval.26  In other words, the HHS Secretary changed the agency’s 
internal rule management process to require the FDA to provide more spe-
cific information to the Secretary, thereby facilitating greater direct politi-
cal oversight of the FDA. 
What is important to note about these examples of internal reform is 
that none of them were the direct result of a statute or executive order de-
tailing an agency’s design.  Instead, they all illustrate how agency heads 
 20 Moe & Wilson, supra note 5, at 14. 
 21 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 22 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT NO. 516, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKINGS 
9–15 (2013), http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/516.pdf [http://perma.cc/99V8-W3GK]; Sarah N. 
Lynch, SEC Looks to Economists for Legal Cover, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012, 6:23 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-sec-economic-analysis-idUSBRE83F16W20120416 
[http://perma.cc/4VVS-CSC6]. 
 23 See Bruce R. Kraus, Economists in the Room at the SEC, 124 YALE L.J.F. 280, 302–04 (2015), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/KrausPDF_g8okks6z.pdf [http://perma.cc/6UZR-CAVH].  
 24 See Raising the Level of Rulemaking Authority of the Food and Drug Administration in Matters 
Involving Significant Public Policy; Response to Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,052 (May 11, 
1981). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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possess substantial autonomy to make these kinds of organizational choices 
themselves.27  Focusing on agency divisions in this manner raises a novel 
set of questions distinct from those raised in the interagency context: For 
example, how do agency heads organize and coordinate overlapping divi-
sions to accomplish their respective goals, and are these coordination tools 
different than those deployed within the executive branch more broadly?  
To what extent are these intra-agency structures and processes influenced 
by the President and Congress, or other external actors?  More generally, 
what factors might explain the organizational forms that agencies take, and 
why? 
Asking such questions responds in part to the lament that “internal ad-
ministrative law” has been “largely ignored by modern administrative law 
scholarship.”28  In other words, the myopic focus on exterior constraints 
has failed to account fully for the ways in which agency actors actually 
understand themselves to be restrained — by the rules, procedures, and hi-
erarchies that determine their everyday interactions with each other and the 
public.  Consequently, despite some valuable advances,29 the resulting lit-
erature has yet to sufficiently incorporate the lessons and perspectives from 
public administration’s long concern with internal agency norms and so-
cialization;30 organizational theory’s insights on the implications of alter-
 27 See KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 113 (“Like previous administrations, the new regime viewed 
reorganization as a means to establish institutional arrangements that could facilitate the adoption of its 
policies and dissolve those structures that hindered the realization of its objectives.”); Robinson, supra 
note 7, at 488 (“Internal structural arrangements for [various] agencies are within the prerogative of the 
agency or, in appropriate cases, the executive department in which it resides.”). 
 28 Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE 
L.J. 1362, 1470 (2010); see also Sidney Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: 
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 464 (2012) (noting that the 
dominant “paradigm treats public administration as a simple agent of the legislature, rather than a 
substantive institution in its own right, even though this understanding has always been at odds with 
regulatory and legislative realities”). 
 29 See, e.g., Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 10, at 1464–65; Jerry L. Mashaw, Mirrored 
Ambivalence: A Sometimes Curmudgeonly Comment on the Relationship Between Organization Theory 
and Administrative Law, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24 (1983); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public 
Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2501422 [http:// http://perma.cc 
/U9M4-PL3S]; Peter H. Schuck, Organization Theory and the Teaching of Administrative Law, 33 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1983); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative 
Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (2011); Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government Works: The Missing Institutional 
Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2013); William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of 
Administrative Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 1 & 2, 2015, at 61; David A. Weisbach & 
Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 985–92 (2004); see 
also sources cited infra notes 34, 36–41. 
 30 See Metzger, supra note 29 (manuscript at 16–19); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 29, at 597 
(“The public administration literature emphasizes how bureaucratic controls, organizational culture, and 
professionalism ensure the democratic accountability of agencies.”); Shapiro, supra note 29, at 1, 5–10 
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native bureaucratic arrangements;31 congressional information theories in 
political science;32 or the “new institutional” turn in economics and devel-
opments in theories of the firm.33 
Previous legal scholars have certainly considered questions of internal 
agency structure, but the bulk of this work was done decades ago, largely 
in the context of administrative adjudication, as opposed to rulemaking34 
— the non-exclusive focus here.  As adjudication waned as a policymaking 
vehicle,35 commenters turned in earnest to other rulemaking issues, but 
analogous questions of agency structure and process did not follow suit as 
readily.  When they have arisen, the resulting inquiries have been pursued 
in discrete contexts such as cost-benefit analysis,36 or else in narrower case 
studies of select agencies or subject areas.37  More recent legal scholarship 
(“Public administration . . . is largely focused on how hierarchy controls, institutional norms, and 
professionalism promote accountability from inside an agency . . . .”  Id. at 1.). 
 31 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 1997); JAMES Q. 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 23–28 (1989). 
 32 See, e.g., KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991). 
 33 See, e.g., EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
(2d ed. 2005); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975); Jean Tirole, The 
Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1 (1994). 
 34 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of 
Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(1986); Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency 
Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1991).  Similarly, Professor Michael Asimow’s analysis of 
the internal separation of functions is primarily focused on adjudication, though he does briefly 
consider issues related to rulemaking.  See Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls: Separation of 
Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM L. REV. 759, 792–796 (1981).  He 
largely concludes that “arguments for separation are unpersuasive when ordinary notice-and-comment 
procedures are employed, and only slightly more persuasive when the rules are made through” formal 
procedures.  Id. at 793.   
 35 See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1992, 2017 (2012) (“[S]ince the 1970s, informal rulemaking has been the preferred means of 
implementing agency policy, instead of individualized agency adjudications.”). 
 36 See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Michael A. Livermore, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 609 (2014). 
 37 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 112–133 (discussing Federal Trade Commission internal 
organization); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) 
(the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT 
THE EPA 184–202 (rev. ed. 2012) (EPA); RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS 
135–36 (2005) (national intelligence agencies); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: 
Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 
(2009) (the Federal Security Agency); Luis Garicano & Richard A. Posner, Intelligence Failures: An 
Organizational Economics Perspective, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2015, at 151, 152 (national intelligence 
agencies); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 443 (1990) (NHTSA); Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 57 (1991) (EPA); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of 
Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1655 (2006) (national intelligence agencies). 
8 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
has also considered the internal dynamics of agencies more broadly, but 
has largely focused on mechanisms directly imposed by Congress and the 
President,38 as opposed to this study’s focus on agency leaders.  This still-
nascent literature has further addressed distinct, but related topics, such as 
the ways in which particular offices within an agency can exert influ-
ence,39 how agencies regulate themselves,40 and how internal constraints 
interact with separation-of-powers concerns41 as well as a potential consti-
tutional “duty to supervise.”42 
This Article seeks to synthesize and build upon these efforts to examine 
how agency heads, as opposed to Congress or the President, can design in-
ternal structures and processes to further their own regulatory agendas.  
The central claim is that agency heads will engage in reorganizations or 
procedural reforms in response to changed informational needs, but only 
when the projected value of such information outweighs the implementa-
tion costs for any given constraint.  These constraints include budgetary 
limitations as well as fixed legislative and executive design choices.  In 
turn, agency heads will choose intra-agency coordination mechanisms to 
facilitate the production of information that has become increasingly valu-
able due to changes in preferences or exogenous uncertainties. 
 38 Professors Magill and Vermeule, for example, note the many ways in which an agency’s 
“structure and required processes . . . allocate authority within the agency.”  Elizabeth Magill & Adrian 
Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1072 (2011).  Their main examples, 
however, all focus on the way in which Congress and the President, as opposed to the agency head 
herself, can make organizational determinations.  For instance, they observe that Congress often vests 
specific responsibilities to statutory delegates, just as the President occasionally designates specific 
officials within an agency to perform certain functions or duties.  See id. at 1072–73.  Their examples 
of agency structural choices are those that “are explicitly fractured by law.”  Id. at 1059 (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, they point out that statutory provisions like the deliberative privilege exception in 
the Freedom of Information Act or the Administrative Procedure Act’s adjudication requirements can 
also allocate authority within the agency in different ways.  See id. at 1074–76.  See also Hyman & 
Kovacic, supra note 10 (also focusing on structural constraints imposed by Congress and the President). 
 39 See Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 60–62 (2014). 
 40 See Elizabeth Magill, Annual Review of Administrative Law — Foreword, Agency Self-
Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859 (2009).  Magill anticipates some of this Article’s themes when 
she mentions the ways in which “[a]gencies can use self-regulatory measures to advance their policy 
goals, whatever those may be.”  Id. at 883.  For example, they could “structure the decisionmaking 
process to facilitate desired outcomes” as well as require centralized or decentralized decisionmaking, 
give certain officials sign-off authority, or withhold it.  See id. at 886.  The analysis here seeks to 
generalize and develop these insights further by drawing upon team production and principal-agent 
theories.   
 41 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2324–27 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, The 
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 
426–34 (2009); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
515, 530–50 (2015). 
 42 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015). 
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To better understand how agency heads approach organizational deci-
sions, Part I first examines the nature of the organizational problem facing 
the agency head.  Specifically, it draws upon the social science literature to 
conceive of administrative agencies as information-processing organiza-
tions, and considers how leaders subdelegate their responsibilities accord-
ingly.43  In contrast with administrative law scholarship’s tendency to fo-
cus only on principal-agent premises, the analysis also explores the issue 
as one of team production: how agency heads manage their internal re-
sources and staff in common pursuit of regulatory production.  The main 
idea here is that, holding all else constant, increases in exogenous levels of 
uncertainty will prompt intra-agency reforms that promote the more effi-
cient transmission of privileged information to the agency head.   
Part II then provides a typology of coordination mechanisms that agen-
cy heads can use to prioritize the information most important to them.  
These tools include structural choices such as the centralization of internal 
oversight, the specialization of functions and divisions, as well as the sepa-
ration of decisionmaking and analyses.  In addition, agency heads can also 
coordinate through various processes such as the standardization of infor-
mation and the implementation of procedures governing clearance authori-
ty and priority-setting within the agency.  Finally, Part III evaluates the 
tradeoffs between these various coordination approaches from the broader 
outlook of the administrative state as a whole.  Specifically, increased in-
tra-agency coordination could introduce broader threats to political ac-
countability, efficiency, and the protection of scientific expertise across 
agencies.  At the same time, such risks could be ameliorated by legislative 
changes designed to increase the transparency of internal coordination de-
vices, as well as judicial doctrines that police against inappropriate forms 
of political influence. 
I.  INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 
This Part examines features of the bureaucratic autonomy afforded to 
agency heads by the inevitably incomplete agency design choices made by 
Congress and the President.44  The first section describes the position and 
diverse goals of the agency head, who wields considerable managerial dis-
 43 See sources cited infra note 93.  
 44 Cf. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2001) (discussing 
how organizational reputation can foster latitude from Congress and the President to spur policy 
innovation); DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER (2010) (arguing that the FDA’s 
reputation for exercising enforcement discretion has enhanced its regulatory power); GREGORY A. 
HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY (2007) (arguing that agencies can use 
discretion to pursue “strategic neutrality” to garner political support); George A. Krause, The 
Institutional Dynamics of Policy Administration: Bureaucratic Influence over Securities Regulation, 40 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1083 (1996). 
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cretion.  The second section develops a theory of bureaucratic design 
based on the concept of administrative agencies as information-processors, 
while the last section considers the kinds of information that agency heads 
often find valuable during the rulemaking process. 
A.  The Agency Head 
Legislative and executive choices can determine many aspects of agen-
cy structure and process.45  These congressional and presidential designs, 
however, inevitably leave significant organizational slack.  To illustrate 
from the grantmaking context, consider the restructuring efforts of the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in the wake of the agency’s contro-
versial decision to fund Robert Mapplethorpe’s sexually explicit art.46  The 
NEA consequently became a political target, as House Republicans that 
vowed to end the Endowment were finally voted into power.47  In anticipa-
tion of the impending budget cuts, the NEA’s Chairwoman, Jane Alexan-
der, decided to impose new structures and processes in an attempt to “de-
velop a new public image and shift [the agency’s] constituency.”48  In 
doing so, her hope was to “survive” legislative opposition.49  
After months of internal agency deliberations, Alexander first decided 
to change the NEA’s programmatic structure.50  While the agency had pre-
viously had seventeen independent programs with their own budgets and 
review panels, Alexander now called for the specialization of her staff ac-
cording to the four “themes” of “Creation & Presentation, Education & 
Access, Heritage & Preservation, and Planning & Stabilization.”51  In ad-
dition, she standardized the information requested by the grant application 
and condensed its requirements to a single set of guidelines that empha-
sized what the arts had in common, as opposed to the prior disciplinary fo-
cus (in literature, dance, and so on).52  She also designed a new set of in-
ternal review procedures around these themes.53 
Importantly, Congress had mandated a particular internal review pro-
cess of its own.  Specifically, it required internal statutory panels with ge-
ographic, ethnic, and artistic diversity to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Arts Council, a group nominated by the President to review 
applications before forwarding them to the NEA Chairwoman for a final 
 45 See infra section II.B.2. 
 46 See Thomas Peter Kimbis, Planning to Survive: How the National Endowment for the Arts 
Restructured Itself to Serve a New Constituency, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 239, 241 (1997). 
 47 Id. at 242. 
 48 Id. at 239, 242. 
 49 Id. at 239. 
 50 Id. at 244. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 246–48. 
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decision.54  On top of this legislatively mandated procedure, however, Al-
exander added initial steps of review designed to influence the grants even-
tually awarded.  To do so, she created review groups composed of experts 
from various artistic disciplines, who would then forward their rankings to 
new Combined Arts Panels (CAPs) structured around the four program-
matic themes.  While the CAPs complied with the statutory requirements, 
the initial review groups did not.55 
In this manner, faced with hostility to the agency’s mission, the NEA’s 
Chairwoman shifted the agency’s priorities and designed new organiza-
tional means of implementing them.  She, not Congress or the President, 
was the “[c]hief” actor in this redesign effort.56  In particular, the Endow-
ment “restructured itself as an agency benefitting art audiences and other 
art users, in addition to its former constituency of artists.”57  Congress had 
specified some aspects of these internal dynamics, to be sure, but the 
agency head was able to supplement them in pursuit of her own goals. 
The ultimate goals of individual agency heads, of course, are more di-
verse than those of private firm managers with profit-maximizing incen-
tives — though both face analogous organizational challenges.58  Indeed, 
the administrative state features many different types of agency heads — 
government executives charged with administering the agency.59  Most are 
political appointees, often presidentially picked and Senate confirmed.60  
 54 Id. at 247–48. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id at 239; see also id. at 247–48. 
 57 Id. at 248. 
 58 See WILSON, supra note 31, at 197 (“[G]overnment executives face a different set of personal 
incentives than do private executives.  The head of a business firm is judged and rewarded on the basis 
of the firm’s earnings — the bottom line.”); cf. ALFRED P. SLOAN, JR., MY YEARS WITH GENERAL 
MOTORS 139–143 (1990) (explaining the implementation of a reporting system for General Motors 
managers as a method of controlling a decentralized organization).  That said, future work should do 
more to explore the many fruitful analogies between private firm managers and agency heads arising 
from their shared problem of how to manage information in large organizations.   
 59 See WILSON, supra note 31, at 196 (“[G]overnment . . . executives are responsible for 
maintaining their organizations.”). 
 60 Id. at 198 (“The chief executive of most federal agencies, bureaus, and departments is a political 
appointee.”).  Political appointees can be defined broadly to include “any employee who is appointed 
by the President, the Vice President, or agency head.”  Political Appointees, U.S. OFF.  GOV’T ETHICS, 
http://www.oge.gov/Topics/Selected-Employee-Categories/Political-Appointees (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/953F-DZG5].  As Professor Nina Mendelson further explains: 
The layer of appointed agency officials subject to Senate confirmation in a given agency is 
often two or three deep, occasionally four.  The President may have the ability to select 
officials lower down in the agency as well, but these appointments do not depend on Senate 
confirmation. 
 For example . . . at the Department of Labor the secretary and deputy secretary of labor 
are presidential appointees, subject to Senate confirmation.  The assistant secretaries are 
subject to Senate confirmation as well.  But other posts, such as the associate deputy 
secretary, deputy assistant secretaries, and chiefs of staff, include “noncareer” (or political) 
appointees exempt from Senate confirmation. 
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Others, such as the heads of the National Weather Service or the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, are career bureaucrats promoted 
from within the agency or comparable agencies.61  The professional trajec-
tories of agency heads are also varied, ranging from years of prior gov-
ernment service to previous careers in elected office, academia, or the pri-
vate sector.  The institutional features of these positions are similarly 
diverse.  Sometimes, for example, agency heads are removable at will, or 
alternatively, for cause.62  They may be subject to tenure limits.63  In addi-
tion, agency heads can serve alone at the top of the agency hierarchy or as 
part of a multimember commission or board,64 which may be subject to 
partisan-balancing requirements.65 
Agency heads cannot promulgate rules without statutory authorization 
and, in this sense, many of their substantive goals are fixed by Congress.  
Most authorizing statutes, however, are ambiguous and thus allow for sub-
stantial discretion.66  Constraints imposed by the executive and the courts 
are similarly limited in scope, whether due to statutory restrictions or sim-
ple time and resource limitations.67  As a result, agency heads are not al-
ways the perfect agents of the President or Congress, and thus their organ-
izational design choices deserve study in their own right.  Indeed, this 
basic premise — that agency heads have preferences that do not always 
align with that of their principals — has generated decades of scholarship 
attempting to explain or mitigate the principal-agent problems posed by the 
federal bureaucracy.68 
In turn, there are many explanations for the potential preference diver-
gence between agency heads and their political overseers.  First is the pro-
spect of bureaucratic capture, the notion that agency actors are beholden to 
external special interests, whether the regulated industry or broader public 
Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the Agencies, 64 DUKE 
L.J. 1571, 1582-83 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive 
Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786–89 (2013). 
 63 Id. at 789–92. 
 64 Id. at 792–97.  While the focus of this Article’s analysis is on the single presidentially appointed 
agency head, future work should consider the additional organizational dynamics introduced by 
multimember commissions. 
 65 Id. at 797–99. 
 66 Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (“[M]ost statutes are ambiguous to 
some degree.”). 
 67 See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 
(2006); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Essay, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010). 
 68 For a useful overview, see Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 336–42 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 
2010). 
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interest groups.69  The revolving door that often ensures that departing 
agency heads can continue their careers with these same interest groups 
only exacerbates this concern.70  Yet another possibility is that political 
appointees may end up supporting the views of their zealous career staff, 
as opposed to those of their political monitors.71  Finally, even the most 
would-be faithful agency heads are agents of multiple principals, and must 
thus make difficult tradeoffs in their attempts to serve many masters.  
These tradeoffs arise any time the goals set forth by regulatory principals 
conflict.  
When Congress and the presidency are controlled by different political 
parties, for instance, there are likely to be diverging amounts of demand 
for regulations and disagreements about their desired scope.  Tensions may 
also arise under conditions of unified government, as when agency heads 
are subject to statutes directing their agencies to pursue several, conflicting 
goals.72  Consider, for example, the Director of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement’s legislative mandate to “balance[]” various considerations, in-
cluding the need for timber and minerals, as well as the protection of sce-
nic and scientific values.73  In these situations, the Director must make 
regulatory policy decisions that necessarily trade off between multiple, 
contradictory interests.  Similarly, the head of the Department of the Inte-
 69 See generally, e.g., PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY 
AGENCIES (1981).  According to this argument, regulated industries have the resources, incentives, and 
information necessary to influence agency actors, while public interest groups are also influential given 
their ability to marshal publicity and political pressure.  See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. 
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory 
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169 
(1990). 
 70 See QUIRK, supra note 69, at 143–74. 
 71 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1994, at 167, 176.  These views may be particularly informed by some career staff that have 
spent decades or even their entire careers at the agency, perhaps becoming heavily invested in the 
release of internally resource-intensive regulatory actions.  See David B. Spence, Administrative Law 
and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 
407, 424 (1997) (“[A]n agency with a well-defined mission will tend to attract bureaucrats whose goals 
are sympathetic to that mission.”). 
 72 See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal 
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 73 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2012) (defining “multiple use” as “the management of the public lands and 
their various resource values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present 
and future needs of the American people . . . a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that 
takes into account the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, 
including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and 
natural scenic, scientific and historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the 
various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily 
to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output”); see 
also Biber, supra note 72, at 3.   
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rior is charged with protecting natural resources, managing offshore leas-
ing, collecting revenue, and overseeing permitting and operational safety.74 
Given their resource and cognitive constraints, different agency heads 
will necessarily value certain kinds of data and advice more than other 
kinds according to their own preferences and assessments of relative risk.  
A rich literature accordingly attempts to isolate the more particular deter-
minants of bureaucratic behavior with their respective constraints.  Promi-
nent theories posit that agency heads attempt to maximize their operating 
budgets,75 institutional reputations,76 or future career prospects.77  In reali-
ty, agency heads are likely to have complex utility functions that take into 
account many, if not all, of these considerations.78  The present analysis 
need not choose among these competing hypotheses, but need only assume 
that agency heads act to maximize their own utility when engaging in reg-
ulatory production. 
B.  Agencies as Information Processors 
In pursuit of their respective goals, however, agency heads with rule-
making authority require vast amounts of information.79  Numerous stat-
utes and executive orders mandate that certain kinds of information must 
accompany most regulations: from the rule’s anticipated costs and benefits, 
to impacts on the environment, states, small businesses, and paperwork ob-
ligations.80  Regulatory decisions are sometimes also made on other 
grounds, such as political reasons that are not always disclosed.81  At the 
same time, agency heads must often make regulatory decisions under con-
 74 See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1334–1338a, 1344, 1347–1348 (2012). 
 75 See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 22 
(1971) (defining “bureaucrat” as the “senior official of any bureau with a separate identifiable budget”); 
id. at 36–42 (discussing the theory of budget maximization). 
 76 See CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 44, at 45–67. 
 77 See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 92–96 (1967); GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965), reprinted in 6 THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 
1, 48–50 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005). 
 78 See DOWNS, supra note 77, at 2 (“Bureaucratic officials in general have a complex set of goals 
including power, income, prestige, security, convenience, loyalty (to an idea, an institution, or the 
nation), pride in excellent work, and desire to serve the public interest.”). 
 79 See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 281–85, 302 (2004); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 
1427–29 (2011). 
 80 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2012) (statements regarding unfunded mandates on state, local, or 
tribal governments, or the private sector); 5 U.S.C. § 604 (2012) (regulatory flexibility analyses); 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (environmental impact statements); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D)(ii)(V) 
(2012) (paperwork burden analyses). 
 81 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 
YALE L.J. 2, 19, 23–26 (2009) (collecting examples of agency “failure to transparently disclose 
political influences,” id. at 26). 
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ditions of uncertainty.82  Uncertainty can be defined in many ways,83 but 
as understood here, the concept refers to the gap between the information 
that an agency head currently possesses and the amount of information 
necessary to make a decision with full knowledge of the consequences.84  
Put differently, uncertainty is the difference between the store of infor-
mation required to ensure some outcome and that which is already retained 
by the agency head.  In this sense, regulatory uncertainty consists of the 
agency head’s informational deficit regarding the anticipated impacts of 
the rule.  This deficit, in turn, depends on the probability distribution of the 
rule’s potential effects on the world, as well as the probability that the rule 
itself could be reversed or struck down before implementation.85 
Accordingly, the level of uncertainty increases whenever an exogenous 
political or legal change requires the agency head to gather more internal 
information than is currently available through existing channels.  So, for 
example, as courts began to take a hard look at regulatory policy decisions 
under arbitrary-and-capricious review, agency heads faced greater uncer-
tainty regarding how to formulate and draft their regulations in ways that 
would withstand judicial challenge.86  Holding these dynamics constant, an 
individual agency head’s level of uncertainty also increases when she 
privileges different kinds of information due to a change in preferences for 
particular outcomes.  For example, an FDA appointee with little technical 
training, but deep partisan loyalties, may seek more information about a 
rule’s political implications relative to its expected scientific impacts.  
Similarly, a head of the EPA with political aspirations after leaving her po-
sition might be more concerned with appeasing the White House relative 
to the D.C. Circuit.  Thus, she may seek more information about the Presi-
dent’s preferences, rather than the regulation’s litigation risks. 
 82 See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1427 (“Most government decisions must be made under 
conditions of substantial uncertainty, in which the optimal choice depends on information about 
consequences that can never be known with anything approaching certainty.”). 
 83 Some, for example, understand uncertainty as applying to situations where the probability of 
some harm is nonquantifiable — distinguishing it from the concept of “risk,” where such probabilities 
can be attached.  See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921). 
 84 This definition draws from a concept of uncertainty that some refer to as “decision uncertainty” 
— a state in which the decisionmaker is unable to structure her preferences between alternative 
scenarios.  See Mathew D. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 721, 721, 730 (1985).  This notion is also similar to Professor Jay R. Galbraith’s definition of 
uncertainty as “the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and the 
amount of information already possessed by the organization.”  See JAY R. GALBRAITH, 
ORGANIZATION DESIGN 36–37 (1977) (emphasis omitted).   
 85 See Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Institutionalization of Risk, in ORGANIZATIONS, UNCERTAINTIES, 
AND RISK 299, 305 (James F. Short, Jr. & Lee Clarke eds., 1992) (“[T]he uncertainty faced in 
surrendering control of the outcome of a case to a third party must often be balanced with the 
uncertainty faced when error is reviewed and one is held accountable for decisions.”). 
 86 See infra notes 153–158 and accompanying text. 
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Administrative agencies must thus confront what organizational theo-
rists refer to as the problem of “uncertainty absorption”: how organizations 
operate “when inferences are drawn from a body of evidence and the in-
ferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated.”87  When 
the available data are complex, what constitutes the “correct” interpretation 
of that data is contestable and can yield equally plausible inferences.  As a 
result, the organizational division within the agency that engages in such 
interpretation wields substantial power.88  It is therefore in the agency 
head’s interests to organize these sources in ways that ensure that such in-
formation is presented to her in a way that best serves her priorities.  In 
other words, the agency head can design structures and procedures to pro-
cess internal information in ways that she finds most salient.89  Indeed, 
this analysis assumes that agency heads would rather select policies with 
consequences that are known rather than those that are unknown; that is, 
they are risk averse.90  When consequences are known, an agency head 
can take credit accordingly and produce outcomes in line with her prefer-
ences.91  By contrast, when consequences are uncertain or unknown, there 
is a risk that the agency head will be unable to achieve her desired results 
— surprise and humiliation loom.92 
In this sense, the agency can be understood as an information proces-
sor.  The literature treating organizations as information-processing sys-
tems is vast and interdisciplinary,93 but one insight that emerges and is de-
 87 JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 165 (1958). 
 88 See Thomas H. Hammond, Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics, 
30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 379, 415 (1986) (indicating that in a hierarchical model of an organization, “only 
one person may be needed to knock [an alternative] out of further consideration” (emphasis omitted)); 
Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 388 (1998) 
(characterizing “privileged access to [a] resource” as a form of power within an organization). 
 89 See McCubbins et al., supra note 3, at 256 (describing as one “motive for broad delegation of 
authority” the situation in which “political leaders are uncertain about what politically is the most 
desirable policy” and thus “[i]t can then be in their interest to set in motion processes that will resolve 
these uncertainties and that will use the newly acquired information to carry out the policy preferences 
they would have if fully informed”); cf. Coglianese et al., supra note 79, at 279 (analyzing how 
regulators use various strategies and procedures to gather information from regulated industries). 
 90 Cf. KREHBIEL, supra note 32, at 62 (describing legislators’ preference to select policies with 
known consequences over those with uncertain consequences). 
 91 Cf. id. 
 92 Cf. id. 
 93 See generally, e.g., JAMES A. BRICKLEY, CLIFFORD W. SMITH & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, 
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE (5th ed. 2009); RICHARD M. 
CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); GALBRAITH, supra note 
84; JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS (1972); Roy Radner, 
Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382 (1992); Roy Radner & 
Timothy Van Zandt, Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale, ANNALES D’ÉCONOMIE 
ET DE STATISTIQUE, January/June 1992, at 265; Roy Radner, The Organization of Decentralized 
Information Processing, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1109 (1993); Timothy Van Zandt, Real-Time 
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veloped in depth here is that managers often attempt to optimize the organ-
ization’s capacity to process information in light of changes in external un-
certainties.94  In this view, as uncertainty increases, the agency’s existing 
information-processing capacity is challenged.  To avoid an undesired de-
crease in output, the agency head must react by increasing the agency’s in-
formation-processing capacity.95  The manager or agency head can do so 
in multiple ways — the most important of which, for our purposes, is by 
decreasing the costs of coordination among the agency’s various divisions.  
In this sense, the institutional design problem facing the agency head can 
be understood as one of how to manage a team with superior information 
efficiently to achieve some level of desired regulatory output.  When agen-
cy heads are newly appointed or otherwise confronted with novel sources 
of uncertainty, they can impose their own coordination mechanisms to pro-
cess internal information in line with their regulatory goals.96 
Of course, as later discussed, these efforts are themselves limited by 
the costs of implementing these changes subject to various constraints.  
These constraints could include both budgetary limits as well as any organ-
izational restrictions imposed by Congress, the President, and parent agen-
cy heads (such as, for example, the Secretary of HHS’s oversight of the 
FDA’s commissioner).  More generally, for any fixed constraint, agency 
heads will engage in reorganizations or process reforms in response to 
changed informational needs only when the expected value of such infor-
mation outweighs the implementation costs. 
In adopting this approach, this analysis seeks to expand beyond the 
dominant tendency of administrative law scholarship to conceive of bu-
reaucracies solely in principal-agent terms — that is, primarily defined by 
a divergence of preferences between agency heads and their staff.  From 
this assumption, the principal-agent paradigm largely presumes that organ-
izations set up hierarchies in order to yield the benefits of subordinate ex-
pertise while minimizing shirking and other agency costs.97  By contrast, 
Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents, 66 
REV. ECON. STUD. 633 (1999). 
 94 See GALBRAITH, supra note 84, at 174–75.  See generally MARSCHAK & RADNER, supra note 
93. 
 95 See GALBRAITH, supra note 84, at 37 (indicating that an increase in variables that an 
organization must consider will lead to “bottlenecks”). 
 96 See KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 9 (“In their efforts to shape policy outcomes, executives seek to 
control the process by which decisions are reached.”); Hammond, supra note 88, at 382 (“The structure 
of a bureaucracy . . . influences which options are to be compared, in what sequence, and by whom 
[such that] a particular organizational structure is, in effect, the organization’s agenda.” (emphasis 
omitted)); Magill, supra note 40, at 886; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 985–92 (discussing 
coordination costs).  
 97 See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND 
MANAGEMENT 214–39 (1992).  See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Hierarchical Control and 
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the team production approach initially assumes away divergent preferences 
between the agency head and her staff.98  Instead, it considers the distinct 
problems that arise when productive activity requires the coordination and 
investment of resources by two or more groups or individuals within an 
organization.99 
Why is the team theory approach not only plausible, but also a persua-
sive way to understand the bureaucracy?  While principal-agent perspec-
tives have long traded on anecdotes of defiant career staff, thicker case 
studies of the sort found in the public administration literature emphasize 
instead the ways in which civil servants seek to support — not undermine 
— their political principals.100  One explanation for this observation arises 
from how civil servants often perceive their own roles: “to present infor-
mation to political appointees, to let the appointees make the decision, and 
then to carry out the president’s or the appointee’s directives.”101  Many 
career staff, that is, understand their function as that of information provi-
sion, not policymaking.  As a result, this “internal code of conduct” can 
mitigate temptations to otherwise resist appointed superiors.102  At the 
same time, civil servants may also act as team players out of self-
interest.103  Recalcitrant career staff in the Senior Executive Service, for 
example, can face possible demotions, undesirable reassignments, and even 
termination.104  Career civil servants may also cooperate in search of ca-
Optimum Firm Size, 75 J. POL. ECON. 123 (1967) (discussing diminishing returns to scale within 
hierarchical organizations). 
 98 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 984 (characterizing team theory as an approach that 
“assume[s] away any divergence of preferences among individual agents”). 
 99 See Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657, 658–60 (1994); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A 
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999); Luis Garicano, 
Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production, 108 J. POL. ECON. 874, 874 (2000); 
Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 983–84. 
 100 See, e.g., MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? (2000); James P. 
Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third 
Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57 (1987). 
 101 GOLDEN, supra note 100, at 155; see also id. (“[C]areer civil servants are motivated, at least in 
part, by their role perception, and . . . this role perception leads them to cooperate with their appointed 
principals in the executive branch.”). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 23 (finding “considerable support” for the idea that “[c]areer civil servants frequently acted 
in ways that served their own self-interest,” and finding that “self-interest calculations led to a wide 
range of behaviors . . . including complying with the directives of political principals”). 
 104 See id. at 158–59 (“Career bureaucrats cooperated rather than resisted because they feared for 
their jobs, wanted to avoid the wrath of their appointed bosses, did not want to be demoted or banished, 
and sought to advance their careers.”); see also Patricia W. Ingraham & Charles Barrilleaux, Motivating 
Government Managers for Retrenchment: Some Possible Lessons from the Senior Executive Service, 43 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 393, 395 (1983) (noting that the “act of signing the SES contract removed the 
managers from many of the traditional securities of civil service protection” and discussing the 
incentives that were meant to “provide the president and his appointees with a more flexible and 
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reer advancement by “hitch[ing] their wagons” to well-connected agency 
heads.105  For any of these reasons, bureaucrats may in fact be more re-
sponsive than resistant to their appointed superiors. 
At the same time, of course, these two perspectives — principal-agent 
and team-oriented — are, in many ways, inextricably linked.  Principal-
agent problems often arise because of information asymmetries, and, in 
this respect, efforts to reduce internal information-acquisition costs can al-
so help mitigate potential agency problems.  As such, principal-agent in-
sights are still relevant to the present analysis and will be developed fur-
ther in future work.106  The main thesis explored in the present study, 
however, is that internal managerial forms arise not only to monitor and 
police agents, but also to handle limitations on information processing.  It 
is these limitations, in turn, that require that relevant informational tasks be 
divided and then coordinated through higher tiers in the agency’s hierar-
chy, or through other related structures and processes.107  This perspective 
accordingly focuses on minimizing not only agency costs, but information 
costs as well. 
C.  The Need for Subdelegation 
For the same reasons that Congress and the President delegate to agen-
cy heads, so too must agency heads delegate within their own ranks.108  
These subdelegations can arise because agency heads face numerous con-
straints — whether in terms of time, expertise, or resources — requiring 
them to rely on agents within the bureaucracy to help produce rules and 
sustain them through various political and legal challenges.  As a result, 
agency heads frequently require a team that can provide the requisite in-
formation to draft a regulation and help determine its substance.109 
This section accordingly discusses some of the most important devel-
opments in the administrative state that have influenced agency heads’ 
need for certain kinds of internal information, whether political, legal, eco-
responsive managerial corps which would be more clearly accountable to presidential leadership and 
direction”).  
 105 GOLDEN, supra note 100, at 159. 
 106 That work will attend, among other things, to the ways in which agency heads design internal 
structures and processes to undermine or otherwise avoid incompetent or uncooperative career staff.  
Whether principal-agent or team theory oriented models are ultimately more valuable will depend in 
part on how well they describe the actual behavior of agency actors.  It is possible that both models are 
useful given the variety of administrative agencies, their individual histories and cultures, and the 
resulting potential (or lack thereof) for preference divergence between agency heads and their career 
staff. 
 107 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 984. 
 108 See Magill, supra note 40, at 884–86. 
 109 See Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1427–30 (discussing agents “or their subordinates,” id. at 1429, 
conducting research in order to respond to scientific, economic, and political uncertainties facing 
agencies).   
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nomic, or scientific in nature.110  The account is not intended to be com-
prehensive, only illustrative.111  While there is a rich literature about how 
agencies acquire information from external sources,112 the inquiry here is 
distinct.  Specifically, the analysis holds the level of information possessed 
by the agency constant, and asks how exogenous dynamics can change the 
agency head’s demand for that information within the agency. 
1.  Political. — Administrative agencies are subject to multiple politi-
cal overseers that possess numerous means to delay or otherwise prevent a 
regulation from going into effect.  Congress, for example, has always been 
able to override a regulation by amending the authorizing statute.113  In 
addition, Congress could refuse to grant an agency funds to enforce the 
rule, or subject the agency head to bruising oversight hearings.114  Because 
passing new legislation is difficult, a number of innovations have also 
sought to lower the cost of striking down an agency’s regulation.  The leg-
islative veto, for example, attempted to reserve to Congress the ability to 
nullify executive actions exercised pursuant to the underlying statute — 
though it was eventually struck down as unconstitutional.115  Instead, 
Congress must now pass a joint resolution of disapproval under the Con-
gressional Review Act116 to overturn a regulation, which like a statutory 
amendment also requires presidential assent.117 
 110 The boundaries between these categories of knowledge are contestable and fluid but map onto 
familiar typologies in administrative law and other disciplines.  See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 
105 (arguing that the Federal Trade Commission “commissioner has the license to consider legal, 
economic, political, and other factors in reaching his decision”); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 
1077–78 (“The ongoing contest over the roles of expertise, legalism, and politics in administrative law 
can . . . be viewed in sociological terms as a contest among different types of professionals, with 
different types of training and priorities.”).  See also ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL 
WORLD (1999), in which Professor Goldman distinguishes between special domains of 
knowledge including “science,” “law,” and “democracy.”  Id. at 221–348.  Goldman also discusses 
“education” as a domain of knowledge, id. at 349–73, which is not relevant to the bureaucratic context 
as understood here. 
 111 Others have provided more extensive accounts of various external judicial and political 
influences on the agency.  See generally Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38.  The purpose here is to 
reframe some of these external dynamics in terms of categories of information that the agency head 
requires as a result of exogenous factors, thus motivating the various structures and processes discussed 
in Part III. 
 112 See, e.g., Coglianese et al., supra note 79, at 281–85; Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic 
Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 476–77 (2007). 
 113 Cf. R. Douglas Arnold, Political Control of Administrative Officials, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 
280–83 (1987) (discussing ways that Congress may influence agency decisions and operations). 
 114 See Beermann, supra note 67, at 122–26. 
 115 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 (1983). 
 116 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). 
 117 See id.  That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of every new final rule 
and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office.  Id. at 
§ 801(a)(1)(A)–(B).  Within a sixty-day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures to pass a 
joint resolution of disapproval overturning the rule.  Id. at §§ 801(a)(3)(B), 802.  To date, however, the 
statute has been used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule.  That rule was the Occupational 
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The President, for his part, also possesses various mechanisms of con-
trol.  At the most extreme, he could threaten an uncooperative agency head 
with removal.  Alternatively, the President could also seek to exercise di-
rective authority over his appointee.118  Perhaps his most important tool of 
late has been his ability to review executive agency regulations through a 
process currently coordinated by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA).119  President Reagan was arguably the first to exert such 
supervisory control “self-consciously and openly”120 through an executive 
order establishing a review regime that broadly continues through biparti-
san consensus today.  Specifically, under current governing orders, execu-
tive branch agencies must submit “significant” rules to OIRA.121  Signifi-
cant regulations meet one of multiple criteria.  They may be expected to 
have an annual economic effect of $100 million or more; could raise po-
tential inconsistencies with other agencies; “[m]aterially alter the budgetary 
impact of” certain programs; or invoke “novel legal or policy issues.”122 
Many of these criteria reflect factors that presidents consider highly sa-
lient either in terms of advancing their own regulatory agendas or their 
parties’ electoral interests.  Indeed, one explicit standard of presidential re-
view is whether the regulation demonstrates consistency with the “Presi-
dent’s priorities” and prevents “conflict” with “policies or actions taken or 
planned by another agency.”123  OIRA thus helps to coordinate a process 
that explicitly engages in a kind of political review to ensure that the regu-
Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe to 
be unique to the circumstances of its passage.”  MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT 
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008).     
 118 See Kagan, supra note 67. 
 119 See id. at 2277–90. 
 120 Id. at 2277. 
 121 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–46 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 
601 app. at 86–91 (2012).   
 122 Id. § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641–42.  The text in full states:  
“Significant regulatory action” means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule 
that may:  
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the 
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities;  
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by 
another agency;  
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs 
or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or  
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, 
or the principles set forth in this Executive order.   
Id.  OMB’s Circular A-4, in turn, states that “Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a 
regulatory analysis for economically significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).”  
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1 (2003). 
 123 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 640. 
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lation aligns with presidential preferences.124  Should a conflict arise, OI-
RA can effectively reverse an agency action on behalf of the President in a 
number of ways, including the use of “return” letters explaining the reason 
for the return, encouraging the agency to withdraw the rule, or otherwise 
suggesting revisions.125 
Thus, agency heads seeking to avoid reversal of their regulations by the 
President or Congress will demand information about the extent to which 
they will face such external opposition.  Such opposition not only increas-
es the probability that their rules will be reversed, but also is costly in 
terms of the time and resources required to engage and respond.  To mini-
mize these risks, agency heads thus value information about the relative 
likelihood of reversal.  In this sense, such “political information” can be 
understood as knowledge or data about the consequences of a regulation 
for various electoral interests.126  These interests could include those of in-
dividual legislators or the White House, as well as interest groups and oth-
er stakeholders engaged in “fire-alarm” oversight.127 
Political information of this sort is often possessed by political appoin-
tees within the agency, who are sometimes presidentially appointed and 
Senate-confirmed.  Because of their partisan affiliations, such internal ac-
tors often have more knowledge relative to others within an agency about 
how a regulation may be politically perceived.  Because executive branch 
norms constrain informal communications between the White House and 
career civil servants, these communications are often channeled through 
the political appointees in the agency.128  Some agencies also have dedi-
 124 See Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of 
Regulations, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,433, 10,433–34 (2005) (distinguishing between “OIRA’s role as the 
eyes and ears of the president in overseeing regulatory agencies” and its “analytical mission,” id. at 
10,434).   
 125 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 647. 
 126 See McCubbins et al., supra note 3, at 258 (referring to “political information” as that which is 
gained when “the agency learns [through notice-and-comment procedures] who are the relevant 
political interests to the decision and something about the political costs and benefits associated with 
various actions”). 
 127 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (describing “fire-alarm oversight” as a 
“less centralized” type of oversight that relies on “a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices 
that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups” to hold agencies accountable). 
 128 Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1216, 
1223 (2008) (book review) (“A political appointee can usually do battle with the [White House’s] 
Office of Management and Budget over both policy decisions and important issues involving the 
agency’s budget and staffing in a more effective manner than can a career government employee.”); id. 
(“A career FSO Ambassador can communicate with the White House only through the elaborate chain 
of command established by the Secretary of State.  Most politically appointed ambassadors have 
personal relationships with the President that allow them to engage in far more effective direct 
communication with the White House.”). 
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cated offices of legislative affairs, which form more long-term relation-
ships with congressional staff.129 
2.  Legal. — In addition to political checks, administrative agencies are 
also subject to a number of legal constraints reinforced through judicial re-
view.  Many of these requirements arise from the Administrative Procedure 
Act130 (APA), its associated common law doctrines,131 and the agency’s 
own organic statutes.  As a result, agency heads also need legal advice re-
garding a rule’s litigation risks and the extent to which statutes and judicial 
decisions may constrain their regulatory options.  In the words of one ob-
server: 
[T]he main tasks of the lawyer in public administration are divided into two 
basic functions.  One is protective; he must safeguard his agency against legal 
challenge from the outside.  The other is facilitative; time and again officials 
need the expert in framing legal devices for the attainment of administrative 
ends.132 
Put differently, administrative lawyers are trained to anticipate potential lit-
igation risks and help agency heads brainstorm legal options that will al-
low them to accomplish their desired ends.  In this sense, their compara-
tive advantages can best be characterized as providing information about 
the applicable law, as well as how that law will be applied to the circum-
stances of specific rulemakings.133 
Consequently, many agency heads have established general counsel’s 
offices with varying degrees of autonomy from the programmatic operating 
divisions.134  These lawyers’ responsibilities differ across agencies and be-
tween various levels of the hierarchy.  Generally speaking, however, law-
yers in general counsel’s offices often have the following duties related to 
rulemaking: providing legal advice and opinions to the agency and the 
 129 See infra notes 249–252 and accompanying text. 
 130 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 131 See Metzger, supra note 67. 
 132 See Fritz Morstein Marx, The Lawyer’s Role in Public Administration, 55 YALE L.J. 498, 507 
(1946). 
 133 See GOLDMAN, supra note 110, at 273 (characterizing legal knowledge as concerned with the 
“material (nonlegal) facts of the case” and “the legal basis for classifying [a] case under the target 
category or categories”) (emphases omitted); WILSON, supra note 31, at 284 (“[A]s courts become 
more important to bureaucracies, lawyers become more important in bureaucracies.”); Magill & 
Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1078 (“[R]ules and structures that empower lawyers will carry in their 
wake the distinctive culture of lawyers.”). 
 134 See KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 15–26, 36–57 (discussing the role of lawyers within the 
Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition and these lawyers’ clashes with economists); 
Marx, supra note 132, at 499 (“[T]he lawyers one finds hidden in the nooks and crannies of nearly all 
government agencies [are] sometimes formed into fairly compact bodies in such functional units as the 
general counsel’s office, sometimes more or less closely attached to various operating divisions, and 
sometimes doing business as relatively free entrepreneurs by spotting trouble as they look around.”). 
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public; drafting and reviewing reports, rules, and legislation; and generally 
assisting the policymaking process within the agency as a whole.135 
Beyond these functional responsibilities, lawyers are also likely to 
bring a distinctive perspective to regulatory problems, given their general 
background, demographics and professional schooling.136  Some, for ex-
ample, posit that “lawyers, by training, are more tolerant of institutional 
rules and procedures that yield decisions perceived to be wrong or mistak-
en in specific cases but yield superior outcomes in general.”137  With re-
gard to administrative lawyers specifically, others argue that since lawyers 
are not charged with the management or execution of policies, they are 
likely to be more detached than other agency actors and thus able to bal-
ance multiple interests.138  At the same time, however, this orientation has 
also been criticized as fostering an unnecessary amount of conservatism 
and risk aversion, particularly in highly uncertain contexts such as national 
security.139 
Nevertheless, many exogenous doctrinal changes have had the effect of 
increasing or decreasing the internal need for lawyers with these perspec-
tives.140  Perhaps one of the most important examples is that of Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,141 which calls for 
judicial deference to an agency’s reasonable statutory interpretation when 
the underlying statute is otherwise ambiguous.142  Its two-part test is a fa-
 135 Raymond P. Baldwin & Livingston Hall, Using Government Lawyers to Animate Bureaucracy, 
63 YALE L.J. 197, 198 (1953). 
 136 See, e.g., Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1058–62, 1072–73; Schlanger, supra note 39, at 
61; cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 124–25 (2012) (noting the unique role of 
lawyers in military operations).  
 137 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1078 n.141 (citing FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING 
LIKE A LAWYER 8–10 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 103 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010)). 
 138 See Marx, supra note 132, at 516 (“In the character of his counsel, whether on policy or 
operating situations, the government lawyer can convey the value of a just balance of interests . . . .  
Free from the ties that bind other officials to action programs, he is better able to marshal constructive 
detachment in appraising the means of departmental action.” (footnote omitted)). 
 139 See Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 179, 182–83 (2009) (“[M]any people in . . . intelligence agencies claimed that their 
efforts to protect our country were hampered by risk-averse lawyers.”). 
 140 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1042–54. 
 141 467 U.S. 837 (1984).   
 142 Id. at 842–44.  Some lower courts have also incorporated elements of arbitrary-and-capricious 
review and inquire as to whether an agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Sierra Club 
v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2004); Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 1505–07 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of 
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated 
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2105 (1990) (“[Chevron’s] reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the 
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miliar one: first, the judge must ask “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”143  If Congress’s intent is “clear,” then 
that intention governs;144 but if the statute is ambiguous or silent, then in 
Step Two courts ask whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” 
and, if so, defer accordingly.145 
Before Chevron, many cases emphasized the court’s role as the defini-
tive interpreter, but allowed for deference to an agency’s interpretation 
when the agency had demonstrated the “power to persuade,” usually by 
virtue of its expertise and experience administering the statute.146  Conse-
quently, as former EPA general counsel Donald Elliott explains, lawyers 
usually offered a “point estimate” of what they perceived as the “best” 
statutory interpretation.147  In this capacity, lawyers often played a domi-
nant role within the agency.148  Since ambiguous statutes could yield mul-
tiple reasonable interpretations in Chevron’s wake, however, agency heads 
no longer required authoritative answers from lawyers and turned instead 
to subject-specific experts and political appointees within the agency for 
information and advice.149 
Subsequent doctrinal refinements have preserved an interpretive role 
for lawyers,150 but the validity of a legal interpretation now turned on the 
consequentialist policy rationales offered by agencies in the rule’s pream-
ble.151  As a result, administrative processes within an agency evolved to 
reflect this change in informational priorities.152  Agency heads now need-
ed less access to lawyers, and more efficient internal mechanisms for in-
corporating the views of scientists and policy experts into the regulatory 
development process. 
inquiry into whether the agency’s decision is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ within the meaning of the 
APA.”). 
 143 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.   
 144 Id. at 842. 
 145 Id. at 843. 
 146 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 147 See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of 
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2005). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 11–13; Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1046. 
 150 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“[A]dministrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that 
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.  
Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in 
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .”).  If an agency’s interpretation does not qualify 
for Chevron deference, Skidmore deference then again calls for the agency to provide a persuasive legal 
interpretation.  Id. at 234–39. 
 151 See Elliott, supra note 147, at 12–13. 
 152 Cf. id. at 12 (noting the “effect of Chevron on the internal dynamics of agency decision-
making”). 
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3.  Scientific. — Chevron was not the only doctrinal change to augment 
the informational role of scientists and other policy experts within the 
agency.  Most notably, courts have also increased the agency head’s de-
mand for internal agency expertise by extending a “hard look” under arbi-
trary-or-capricious review.153  Under this standard, agencies are required to 
show that they have “examine[d] the relevant data” and then “articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for [their] action.”154  More specifically, these ex-
planations must demonstrate “rational connection[s] between the facts 
found and the choice[s] made.”155  What is important to note about this 
standard is that it is framed exclusively in terms of technocratic factors.156  
Agencies must be able to explain changes in regulatory policy with respect 
to the scientific and policy-specific evidence available in the rulemaking 
record.157  As a result, substantive experts within an agency have become 
increasingly important to aiding the agency head in making the eventual 
policy choice.158 
A number of legislative and executive branch developments have fur-
ther augmented the agency head’s need for internal access to trained scien-
tists and policy professionals.  In the face of criticisms that agencies were 
relying on “junk” science, in 2000, Congress passed the Information Quali-
ty Act.159  The Act directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
to develop guidelines that will help federal agencies develop more agency-
specific information quality guidance; create administrative mechanisms 
allowing affected persons to request informational corrections; and submit 
to OMB periodic progress reports.160 
Pursuant to the statute, OMB soon issued a bulletin defining various 
terms and specifying the substantive standards for information quality, in-
cluding standards of utility, objectivity, and integrity.161  Moreover, the 
bulletin created a presumption of objectivity for “data and analytic results 
 153 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).   
 154 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 155 Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 156 See Watts, supra note 81, at 19–20. 
 157 See id. at 54. 
 158 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1053–55. 
 159 See Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to 2763A-154 (2000), reprinted in 
44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (2012) (Policy and Procedural Guidelines)); see also Margaret Pak, Comment, 
An IQ Test for Federal Agencies? Judicial Review of the Information Quality Act Under the APA, 80 
WASH. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (2005). 
 160 Pak, supra note 159, at 731–32. 
 161 See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8458–60 (Feb. 22, 
2002); see also Patrick A. Fuller, Note, How Peer Review of Agency Science Can Help Rulemaking: 
Enhancing Judicial Deference at the Frontiers of Knowledge, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 940–43 
(2007). 
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[that] have been subjected to formal, independent, external peer review.”162  
Peer review generally consists of an independent, expert review of a 
study’s methodology, analysis, and inferences by individuals capable of 
understanding and critically assessing the reviewed product.163  OMB sub-
sequently issued a separate peer review bulletin applying the first bulletin 
to all “influential scientific information” disseminated by the agency, but 
distinguishing policy determinations left to the agency head’s discretion.164  
As a result, agency heads now require more internal expertise in order to 
withstand higher standards of information quality.  While judicial review 
may be limited, OMB continues to play a role in policing the relevant pro-
visions.165 
4.  Economic. — Finally, another important development influencing 
agency heads’ internal need for information — this time of an economic 
nature — is the rise of what some have called the “cost-benefit” state: the 
convergence of executive, legislative, and judicially imposed requirements 
for agencies to analyze the costs and benefits of their regulations.166  As a 
result, agency heads seeking to successfully promulgate a rule now require 
substantial amounts of economic information from their staff.  To meet 
these demands, federal agencies employed an increasing number of policy 
analysts and economists.167 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can mean different things in different con-
texts,168 but as defined here, it consists of an accounting of the anticipated 
quantitative and qualitative effects of a regulation.  This definition tracks 
that of governing executive orders, which currently require executive 
agencies to analyze economic considerations in addition to political 
ones.169  In doing so, they require covered agencies “to use the best avail-
able techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and 
costs as accurately as possible.”170  The orders also note that agencies 
 162 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of 
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8459. 
 163 See id. at 8459–60. 
 164 See Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan. 14, 2005). 
 165 See Jim Tozzi, DOJ Notifies the Ninth Circuit that OMB is the Court of Last Resort on DQA 
Issues: Implications for Climate Change, CTR. REG. EFFECTIVENESS (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://www.thecre.com/oira/?p=4124 [http://perma.cc/5ZSH-M88P]. 
 166 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE, at ix (2002); Magill & Vermeule, 
supra note 38, at 1049–51. 
 167 See MARION FOURCADE, ECONOMISTS AND SOCIETIES 108–12 (2009). 
 168 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 890 (2015); Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, 
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153 (2000); Amy 
Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 93, 95–96. 
 169 See Exec. Order No. 13,563 §§ 1(b), 2–6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–17 (2012), reprinted as amended in 
5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 101–02 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86–91. 
 170 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. at 216. 
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“may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or im-
possible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distribu-
tive impacts.”171  Agencies must then submit these analyses to OIRA as 
part of the presidential review process.172 
Congress has also imposed a number of legislative demands that man-
date similar cost-benefit considerations, albeit in narrower contexts.  The 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996,173 for example, constituted 
“the first substantive law” to require the use of cost-benefit analysis.174  
Moreover, a number of statutes such as the National Environmental Policy 
Act,175 the Regulatory Flexibility Act,176 the Unfunded Mandates Reform 
Act,177 and the Paperwork Reduction Act178 currently demand that agen-
cies provide information about a rule’s anticipated costs and benefits on 
the environment, states, small businesses, and paperwork obligations, re-
spectively.179  More recently, there have been a number of legislative pro-
posals to require CBAs from independent agencies as well, though none 
have yet managed to garner the requisite bicameral support.180  As such, 
Congress has increasingly sought to require agency heads to provide a 
more explicit consideration of costs and benefits. 
Similarly, courts have also begun to fashion common law default rules 
in favor of allowing agencies to consider CBA when the statute is other-
wise ambiguous.  In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,181 for instance, the 
Supreme Court held that a Clean Water Act provision calling for the “best 
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact”182 al-
lowed the EPA to balance costs and benefits.183  Many have understood 
the case as signaling an increasing judicial receptivity to CBA as a canon 
of statutory construction.184  This understanding is also consistent with a 
 171 Id. 
 172 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B)–(C), 3 C.F.R. at 645–46. 
 173 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (2012). 
 174 Richard D. Morgenstern, The Legal and Institutional Setting for Economic Analysis at EPA, in 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA 5, 20 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).  
 175 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012). 
 176 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012). 
 177 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 178 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012). 
 179 See 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (unfunded mandates on state, local, tribal governments, or private sector); 5 
U.S.C. § 604 (regulatory flexibility analyses); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (environmental impact 
statements); 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D)(ii)(V) (paperwork burden analyses). 
 180 See, e.g., Independent Agency Regulatory Analysis Act of 2015, S. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 181 556 U.S. 208 (2009). 
 182 Id. at 221 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012) (emphasis added)). 
 183 Id. at 226.  Here, the majority read Congress’s silence about the propriety of considering “cost,” 
relative to other statutory provisions in the Act, to mean that the EPA could consider it as a decisional 
factor, and therefore upheld the agency action under Chevron’s reasonableness inquiry.  Id. at 225–26.  
 184 See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 426–28 (2010). 
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number of D.C. Circuit cases interpreting several provisions of the Clean 
Air Act that made no mention of costs to allow the EPA to take costs into 
account.185  More aggressively, the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA186 
interpreted a Clean Air Act provision allowing the EPA to regulate power 
plans when “appropriate and necessary” as a requirement that the agency 
consider costs.187  Similarly, some have read the D.C. Circuit’s Business 
Roundtable v. SEC188 decision to not only allow, but actually mandate, 
CBA as well.189  In this view, a statute requiring the SEC to consider the 
rule’s impact on “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” amounted 
to a requirement that the SEC engage in cost-benefit analysis.190 
II.  INTRA-AGENCY COORDINATION 
By conceiving of the agency as an information processor, this Part de-
velops and applies the resulting insights about how agency heads engage in 
this coordination task and why.  The core idea here is that agency heads 
faced with novel exogenous uncertainties must manage their resources and 
personnel teams to ensure efficient access to favored internal information 
sources.  In doing so, they can choose among various coordination mecha-
nisms designed to reduce the processing costs for particular kinds of privi-
leged information.  Information requires internal processing in the sense 
that it must be interpreted and then effectively communicated to deci-
sionmakers.  Thus, when confronted with exogenous uncertainties requir-
ing more specialized knowledge, agency heads can respond by creating 
structures and processes that lower the costs of internal information pro-
cessing.191 
Specifically, they can lower such costs through structural choices such 
as centralizing their authority through hierarchy, reorganizing their staff to 
gain more direct access to specialized knowledge, or separating informa-
tional sources from final decisionmakers.  Agency heads also have pro-
 185 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 
824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
 186 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 187 Id. at 2711 (holding that the EPA “must consider cost — including, most importantly, cost of 
compliance — before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary”). 
 188 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 189 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of 
Function(s) and Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2008 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 437 (2015).  But see Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The 
Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 
93–98 (2015). 
 190 See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148 (quoting §§ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f), 80a–2(c)). 
 191 See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 83, at 268 (“When uncertainty is present and the task of deciding 
what to do and how to do it takes the ascendency over that of execution, the internal organization of the 
productive groups is no longer a matter of indifference or a mechanical detail.”). 
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cess-oriented options as well, including standardizing informational inputs 
or imposing priority-setting procedures or internal clearance chains that in-
corporate particular kinds of information directly into the decisionmaking 
process. 
A.  Coordination Mechanisms 
Agency heads possess substantial discretion over how to manage their 
agency’s rulemaking resources in ways that further their own goals and 
priorities.  While the APA mandates some features of the internal organiza-
tion of adjudicatory actors,192 no analogous provisions exist for individuals 
engaged in rulemaking.  Instead, many agency enabling acts are silent or 
ambiguous with respect to how agency heads can structure and select their 
rulemaking staff.193  Chairmen of multimember commissions, for example, 
are sometimes authorized to appoint the heads of “major administrative 
units,” but what constitutes a “major administrative unit” is largely in their 
discretion.194  Accordingly, while Congress and the President can write 
more specific dictates governing internal agency organization,195 agency 
heads remain otherwise unbound by detailed legislative or executive stric-
tures.  By and large, the task of intra-agency coordination falls to the 
agency head.196 
Some of the following design choices can be implemented by Congress 
and the President as well, but many are distinctive to the agency head’s 
toolkit.  A few ways in which the management problem for the agency 
head may differ from that of the President is that the former often has less 
relative control over her budget constraint and is also subject to more di-
rect means of accountability; for example, agency heads are often called to 
 192 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012) (isolating administrative law judges from agency prosecutorial 
staff in various ways). 
 193 See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1168 (2000). 
 194 Id. at 1173 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2000)) (describing the example of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission enabling act); see also id. app. (providing numerous other examples). 
 195 The President, for example, can use his reorganization powers to restructure or transform 
independent agencies into cabinet-level agencies.  For example, Executive Order 12,835 made the EPA 
Administrator a member of the new National Economic Council, giving the Administrator “secretary-
like” rank for the first time.  Exec. Order No. 12,835 § 2(k), 3 C.F.R. 586, 587 (1994); see Angel 
Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. 
U.  461, 511 (1994).  For an example of how Congress can affect agency structure, see Joseph J. 
Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 
768–78 (2001), which describes legislative changes resulting in the internal restructuring of the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
 196 See SIMON, supra note 31, at 326–27 (noting that the agency head is responsible for establishing 
and maintaining the organizational structure); Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an 
Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State”, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1506 
(2007) (“[T]he responsibility for intra-agency coordination is peculiarly within the province of . . . the 
head of [the] department or agency . . . .”).  
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testify in defense of their agencies before Congress, while presidents are 
not.197  Moreover, agency heads often have more informal, though less 
transparent, means, of imposing these coordination mechanisms, whether 
through internal memoranda or verbally in meetings.  By contrast, the 
President often operates through more public documents such as executive 
orders or presidential memoranda. 
1.  Centralization. — Organizational theorists and economists have 
long recognized that the centralization of authority is often necessary to 
coordinate dispersed information, especially in the absence of price signals 
that can serve the same function in the market.198  This observation is es-
pecially true in the context of government bureaucracies, which produce 
outputs that are difficult to value and measure.199  Professor Kenneth Ar-
row, for example, points out that “the centralization of decision-making[] 
serves to economize on the transmission and handling of information” 
within organizations.200  In his view, it is less costly and thus more effi-
cient to transmit internal information to a centralized source, rather than to 
multiple individuals within an organization, given that the transmission of 
such information is costly.201 
Not only does such communication take time, but it also requires the 
resource-intensive translation of often complex concepts into forms more 
accessible to generalized audiences.202  Thus, it is often cheaper for one 
individual or office to make the final decision based on that collective in-
formation rather than to decentralize the decisionmaking process.  Vertical-
ly centralizing authority in this manner minimizes the number of expensive 
communication channels within bureaucracies.203 
As a practical matter, centralizing authority within an organization such 
as an administrative agency can take many forms.  What unites these dif-
ferent design choices is the location of the informational source in the 
agency’s vertical hierarchy — how close it is to the authorized final deci-
sionmaker.  Consider as an analogy well-known discussions about central-
 197 See Beermann, supra note 67, at 124–25. 
 198 See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 83, at 268–69.  See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge 
in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526–28 (1945) (arguing that price signals lead to the efficient 
distribution of information). 
 199 See POSNER, supra note 37,at 135–36; Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 992 (“The key 
difference between government and market contexts is that there is no obvious measure to determine 
how well the government is doing . . . .”). 
 200 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974). 
 201 Id. at 68; see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, 
and Organizational Structure, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1995, at  4, 4–6. 
 202 Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1793 
(2013) (describing the ways in which agency staff must “communicate and present” information “to 
nonspecialists” as “a process of translation from unstated assumptions to clearly stated ones, from 
jargon to plain English, from the use of complex appendices to executive summaries, and so on”). 
 203 See ARROW, supra note 200, at 68. 
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ized presidential authority.  These debates often focus on a cluster of relat-
ed phenomena such as the creation of an office like OIRA organizationally 
located near the President, as well as the separate institutionalization of a 
regulatory review process.204 
Similarly, two important strategies to centralize the agency head’s au-
thority within an agency also include structural decisions about organiza-
tional location as well as the establishment of an internal review process.  
To illustrate the first dimension, again through analogy, note that many 
credit the hierarchical placement of OIRA within the executive branch with 
the augmented role that the office has played in rulemaking.205  OIRA is 
part of the OMB within the Executive Office of the President (EOP).206  
OMB is charged with advising the President on budgetary and spending 
matters and, accordingly, also contains several “resource management of-
fices” which evaluate the performance of agency programs and review 
budgetary requests.207  Should an agency refuse to cooperate with OIRA’s 
review, the agency knows it could face proposed cuts to its programs given 
OIRA’s close relationship with OMB’s resource management offices.  Sim-
ilarly, because OIRA is operationally close to other EOP actors such as the 
Domestic Policy Council, it often enjoys more direct channels of access to 
the President’s closest advisors.208  In this manner, OIRA’s organizational 
location close to the President helps to explain its outsized influence on the 
regulatory process, as well as the persistent role that CBA plays in execu-
tive branch rulemaking. 
In this same vein, agency heads might choose to place informational 
sources directly within their offices at the top of the agency’s hierarchy.  
The closer the informational sources — whether economists, lawyers, or 
scientists — are to the organizational apex, the less costly it is for the poli-
cymaking appointee to access and control the resulting information flow.  
Reasons for this dynamic vary.  One explanation has to do with organiza-
tional culture.  Hierarchies inform institutional roles and their perceived 
limits: for example, who should be included in certain meetings with the 
 204 See, e.g., Donald R. Arbuckle, The Role of Analysis on the 17 Most Political Acres on the Face of 
the Earth, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 884, 885 (2011) (“OMB is a key agency within the Executive Office of 
the President, and a significant part of OIRA’s role since its creation has been the coordination of 
regulatory policy within the White House.”); William F. West, Presidential Leadership and 
Administrative Coordination: Examining the Theory of a Unified Executive, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 433, 442–44 (2006) (discussing the impact of the centralized review process); see also Nicholas 
Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 
(2006) (discussing the structure and effect of OMB and OIRA on regulation). 
 205 See, e.g., Arbuckle, supra note 204, at 884–86, 888–89; West, supra note 204, at 433, 444–45. 
 206 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2012). 
 207 The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc 
/4TBH-SYXN]. 
 208 See Arbuckle, supra note 204, at 891. 
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agency head or otherwise consulted.  Another explanation has to do with 
physical location.  Offices within an agency are often physically organized 
according to hierarchies, which affords those higher up the chain with 
greater day-to-day access to agency leadership.  As a result, particular ana-
lysts often speak directly to the agency head as opposed to being filtered 
through multiple hierarchical layers.  The more the informational source is 
integrated as part of the top-level decision apparatus, the more likely its 
considerations will influence the final regulatory option picked. 
One of the most striking examples of this intra-agency design choice 
can be found in executive agencies — once more, in response to the in-
creasing cost-benefit analysis requirements imposed by the President.  Ac-
cording to one former OIRA agency head: “The greatest benefit of OMB 
review . . . may result from the agency mechanisms established to respond 
to the kinds of questions that OMB raises.  In response to Executive Order 
12,291, agencies either established or enhanced their in-house capabilities 
to analyze their regulatory decisions.”209  Specifically, these agencies often 
established separate offices dedicated to economics, and then placed these 
offices at the top of the hierarchy within the office of the agency head. 
Take, for example, the evolution of internal changes at the EPA, organ-
izational choices that lie within the discretion of the EPA Administrator.210  
As background, the EPA is an executive agency charged with developing 
and enforcing federal environmental laws.211  EPA’s regulatory programs 
are mainly structured around its principal sources of statutory authority, in-
cluding different offices dealing with water, air, site cleanup, and pesticides 
and toxic chemicals.212  In addition to these offices, the EPA has always 
had economists on staff, but they have been housed in different locations 
within the agency at different points in the agency’s history.  Before 
Reagan’s executive order, most economists engaged in economic analysis 
were dispersed across the program offices.213  In 1983, however — two 
years into the implementation of the executive order — EPA began to cen-
 209 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1085 (1986). 
 210 See Robinson, supra note 7, at 488 n.12 (“[I]t is important to emphasize that the EPA’s internal 
organization is not a product of congressional design.”). 
 211 See Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa 
.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/H2Y5-CHFU]. 
 212 See Linda K. Breggin & Leslie Carothers, Governing Uncertainty: The Nanotechnology 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Challenge, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 285, 324–25 (2006). 
 213 See MCGARITY, supra note 36, at 240 (“EPA decided in the mid-1970s to decentralize its 
regulatory analysis staff and to give the program offices the primary responsibility for drafting 
regulatory analysis documents . . . .”). 
34 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tralize its economists in offices that have evolved into what is today known 
as the National Center for Environmental Economics (NCEE).214 
The NCEE was established in 2000 within the Office of Policy, which 
is itself located within the Office of the EPA Administrator.215  Before that, 
similar entities were situated in what was then known as the Office of Pol-
icy, Planning and Evaluation, and later moved to the Office of Policy and 
Reinvention.216  As a result of this organizational location, economists 
within the office often have “the ear of the two most influential persons in 
the agency: the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator.”217  Because 
of the NCEE’s organizational location at the top of the hierarchy, the Ad-
ministrator is also able to process the NCEE’s information more cheaply 
and can ensure that it is a core part of the decisionmaking process.  The 
Office of Policy has been aptly described as a “mini-OMB” within the 
EPA to reflect its status as a “powerful institutional force”218 that has been 
“‘consciously integrated’ into the internal rulemaking process.”219  In this 
manner, the NCEE is a high-level, centralized office of professional econ-
omists. 
In addition to this prominent vertical location for cost-benefit analysts, 
the EPA Administrator has also established a centralized review process to 
exercise oversight of CBAs prepared by the subject-matter program offices 
within the agency.  As a general matter, the initial task of regulatory draft-
ing is usually given to career staff within these subject matter–specific of-
fices.220  Their responsibilities usually include conducting research to de-
termine the scope of the regulatory problem as well as generating policy 
 214 See Livermore, supra note 36, at 627–28; Alan Carlin, History of Economic Research at the EPA, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (updated Aug. 2006), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa 
/eed.nsf/00000000000000000000000000000000/2f68aa9ffb75364b8525779700781a24!OpenDocument 
[http://perma.cc/CN9T-NJR3] (“From 1971 to 1983, most . . . . economic analysis . . . took place either 
in [the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation] or in the program offices such as air and water.”).  
 215 Organization and History, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://yosemite.epa.gov 
/EE%5Cepa%5Ceed.nsf/webpages/Organization.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc 
/RZH2-M4YL]; see also Livermore, supra note 36, at 627–28. 
 216 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Environmental Regulation in the 1990s: A Retrospective Analysis, 27 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 384 (2003). 
 217 See MCGARITY, supra note 36, at 256.  
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. (quoting interview by Thomas O. McGarity with Stuart Sessions, Dir., Regulatory Policy Div., 
Office of Policy Analysis, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, Envtl. Prot. Agency (May 29, 
1984)); see also Livermore, supra note 36, at 627–28. 
 220 See OFFICE OF POLICY, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 40 
(2011) [hereinafter EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS], http://yosemite.epa 
.gov/sab%5CSABPRODUCT.NSF/5088B3878A90053E8525788E005EC8D8/$File/adp03-00-11.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/JL4N-E3JW]; Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 999, 1018–19 (2015) (noting that “career civil servants” comprise “the population with the 
greatest likelihood of substantial experience in [rule] drafting and interpretation”). 
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options from which to select.221  In addition, staff within these program 
units will also often prepare the initial regulatory analyses.222  For those 
rules determined to be “economically significant” — that is, expected to 
cost $100 million or more — the rule-writing team is expected to submit a 
draft of the regulations to an internal review process, which includes the 
NCEE.223  The NCEE, along with other EPA offices, can then submit sub-
stantive comments and suggestions for how to revise the rule.  Should dis-
agreements persist, the issue can then be elevated to higher levels of the 
agency’s hierarchy.224  
Consider, by contrast, the vertical placement of economists within in-
dependent agencies not subject to cost-benefit executive orders.  The Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), for example, is a multimember 
commission with jurisdiction over interstate radio, television, satellite, and 
cable communications.225  Like the EPA, the commissioners of the agency 
possess the discretion to organize their own internal staff and resources.226  
In contrast to the EPA, however, the FCC has no office exclusively devot-
ed to CBA.227  In addition, the FCC commissioners have not centralized 
the review of the few economic analyses prepared by the agency’s regula-
tory drafting staff.  Most of its cost-benefit analysts are not professional 
economists and are diffusely spread throughout the agency.228  While the 
FCC does have a Chief Economist, she is usually an academic professor 
visiting in a one- or two-year position appointed by the Commission Chair 
and thus provides only limited economic advice.229  In recent years, the 
position has sometimes been left vacant.230 
 221 See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220, at 38–39; William F. West, The 
Growth of Internal Conflict in Administrative Regulation, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 773, 775 (1988) 
(describing general regulatory drafting process in agencies). 
 222 See MCGARITY, supra note 36, at 256. 
 223 See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220, at 16, 41–44. 
 224 See id. at 43. 
 225 See What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 
25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/S8UP-V959]. 
 226 The statute creating the agency simply provides that the Commission organize its staff into 
“integrated bureaus” and “other divisional organizations” as it “may deem necessary.”  47 U.S.C. 
§ 155(b) (2012); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-79, FCC MANAGEMENT: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN COMMUNICATION, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, AND 
WORKFORCE PLANNING 4–5 (2009). 
 227 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission 7 (Res. 
for the Future, Discussion Paper, No. 11-23, 2011), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF 
-DP-11-23.pdf [http://perma.cc/GXY5-EWWD]. 
 228 See id. 
 229 Id.; see also J. Scott Marcus & Juan Rendon Schneir, Drivers and Effects of the Size and 
Composition of Telecoms Regulatory Agencies 9 n.7 (European Reg’l ITS Conference Paper, 2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1675705 [http://perma.cc/J79D-SUHL]. 
 230 Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative 
State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 712 (2009).  
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Taking a step back from these two illustrations, note that the variation 
in organizational form between the EPA and FCC likely reflects the differ-
ent informational priorities of the EPA’s Administrator and the FCC com-
missioners.  These diverging priorities can be explained, at least in part, by 
the fact that the EPA is subject to OIRA’s review of its cost-benefit anal-
yses, while the FCC is not.  Due to the EPA Administrator’s higher de-
mand for cost-benefit information, centralization is a more attractive coor-
dination strategy because it reduces the internal information-processing 
costs. 
In addition, just as in the interagency context, vertical centralization 
can result in potentially beneficial jurisdictional redundancy and overlap 
for agency heads.231  Indeed, agency heads may seek to subdelegate func-
tionally similar responsibilities to two or more entities for many reasons.  
They could, for example, grant a hierarchically superior office the respon-
sibility to review a lower program office’s work in an attempt to control 
the program’s output; thus an EPA Administrator may use the NCEE to 
monitor the cost-benefit analyses of the EPA’s air or water office.  In doing 
so, the Administrator is able to benefit from two independent assessments 
of a rule’s costs and benefits, while, at the same time, mediating how any 
conflicts should be resolved.232  Alternatively, the agency head may not 
trust either office to generate unbiased economic information.  Thus, she 
may seek to weigh information from the horizontally specialized office 
against information from the more centralized policy shop.  In this way, 
the agency head can attempt to foster productive intra-agency competition 
in order to independently evaluate the information generated as a result.233 
On the flip side, agency heads can also decentralize particular agency 
functions according to their priorities and preferences.  Take, for example, 
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch’s efforts to disperse enforcement respon-
sibilities across various internal agency divisions, including the toxic sub-
stances, water and air pollution, noise and radiation, and solid waste offic-
es.234  As a former Colorado legislator, Gorsuch had gained a reputation as 
 231 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1151; O’Connell, supra note 37, at 1704; Michael M. 
Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 274, 287 (2003). 
 232 See generally Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1151.   
 233 See Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 95, 123 (2014) (providing analysis of “why the heads of agencies will employ agency staff with 
biased policy preferences to generate information about regulatory opportunities, especially when they 
can effectively review the policy decisions of such staff — either themselves or through their own intra-
agency review office”); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1151; Stephenson, supra note 79, at 1463.  
Such subdelegations can also help administrators reduce principal-agent problems by delegating 
monitoring costs to the centralized office.   
 234 See Philip Shabecoff, Environment Agency Chief Announces Reorganization, N.Y. TIMES (June 
13, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/13/us/environment-agency-chief-announces-
reorganization.html. 
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a foe to robust environmental protection policies.235  In line with this repu-
tation, one of her decentralizing reorganizations of the EPA eliminated its 
Office of Enforcement, which had previously coordinated internal en-
forcement efforts.236  Gorsuch also created two new associate administra-
tor positions — one for legal and enforcement counsel and the other for 
policy and resources — who reported directly to her.237 
Despite Gorsuch’s public insistence that the change would foster more 
“efficient operation,”238 in fact, the move “separated technical and pro-
grammatic enforcement staff from the legal enforcement planning and im-
plementation functions.”239  As a result, coordination between these two 
sets of actors decreased.  According to one contemporaneous observer, this 
change “spell[ed] the end to civil or criminal litigation by E.P.A. in all but 
the most extreme cases.”240  In one congressional staffer’s view, the net 
result was that “enforcement activity at the agency would have to be chan-
neled through several bureaucratic levels,” resulting in greater coordination 
costs and thus internal delays.241  In short, Gorsuch no longer sought in-
formation regarding environmental enforcement activities, which was re-
flected in her internal restructuring choices. 
2.  Specialization. — If centralization is a coordination strategy for 
placing informational sources at the top of an administrative hierarchy, 
then specialization is concerned instead with the horizontal allocation of 
tasks across an agency.242  Instead of focusing on the layers of manage-
ment between the decisionmaking authority and informational source, spe-
cialization as understood here examines the ways in which different kinds 
of responsibilities are divided within an agency, independent of their prox-
imity to hierarchical authority.243 
One potentially helpful way to think about this dimension is in terms of 
the difference between functional and divisional forms, a well-known dis-
tinction in the organizational economics literature.244  Functional organiza-
tions allocate staff in terms of their training and disciplinary backgrounds 
 235 Sidney M. Wolf, Hazardous Waste Trials and Tribulations, 13 ENVTL. L. 367, 380 (1983). 
 236 See Shabecoff, supra note 234. 
 237 See id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 EPA Administrator Reorganizes Agency’s Enforcement Operations, EPA 93-R-163, ENVTL. 
NEWS (July 22, 1993), 1993 WL 274976. 
 240 Shabecoff, supra note 234. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 68, at 351–53; Masahiko Aoki, Horizontal vs. Vertical Information 
Structure of the Firm, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 971 (1986). 
 243 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 983–84; cf. Oliver Hart & John Moore, On the Design 
of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization, 113 J. POL. ECON. 675, 676 (2005). 
 244 See, e.g., RICHARD L. DAFT, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN 102–07 (9th ed. 2007); 
Luke M. Froeb, Paul A. Pautler & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Essay, The Economics of Organizing 
Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 575 (2009); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 986–92. 
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— say, by assembling an agency’s political appointees, lawyers, econo-
mists, and scientists into separate groups.245  Thus an agency could have 
dedicated general counsel or economists’ offices that specialize in their re-
spective disciplines.  The benefits of this design choice are opportunities 
for skill development and better staff retention, while the drawbacks in-
clude the potential for more tunnel vision and workload bottlenecks.246 
By contrast to functional entities, divisional organizations disperse in-
formational sources across subject-matter areas or policy sectors.247  For 
example, as previously discussed in the context of the EPA, these divisions 
could focus on specific substantive areas such as air or water pollution, or 
hazardous waste management.  Instead of assigning a lawyer or economist 
to a devoted general counsel or economists’ office, the agency head could 
accordingly assign her to a program office.  Because of the policy-specific 
specialization of divisional forms, the resulting legal or economic analyses 
could thus be more tailored and specialized to the subject matter.  At the 
same time, however, divisional models could also result in uneven quality 
and substantive inconsistency across policy areas.248  Thus, when con-
fronted with a horizontal design choice, agency heads must consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of both functional and divisional forms. 
To illustrate these choices, first consider examples of how some agency 
heads have established functional offices to obtain information about the 
potential political consequences of a regulation.  Political information of 
this kind becomes particularly important when external partisan coalitions 
have changed as a result of new elections or changes in party platforms.  
Accordingly, many agency heads have established specialized offices with-
in their agencies specifically to ensure continuing relationships with mem-
bers of Congress or the President.249 
For instance, a number of agencies have dedicated Offices of Legisla-
tive Affairs, which are usually charged with maintaining a continuing flow 
of political information between the agency and Congress.250  The Federal 
Communication Commission’s version “provides lawmakers with infor-
 245 Froeb et al., supra note 244, at 575–76. 
 246 See id. at 576. 
 247 Id. at 579. 
 248 See id. at 580. 
 249 See, e.g., A.W. Eoff, II, The Navy and the Congress, 22 JAG J. 123 (1968) (discussing the 
establishment and duties of the Office of Legislative Affairs within the Department of the Navy by the 
Secretaries of Defense and of the Navy).   
 250 See, e.g., id.; see also Christopher J. Walker, Federal Agencies in the Legislative Process: 
Technical Assistance in Statutory Drafting 13, 28–30 (2015) (draft report to the Administrative 
Conference of the United States), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/technical-
assistance-draft-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZP2H-PA3V] (describing an agency’s legislative affairs 
office as “the office that is the agency’s official liaison with Congress and manages all agency 
communications and interactions with the Hill,” id. at 13, regarding technical assistance in statutory 
drafting). 
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mation regarding FCC regulatory decisions, answers to policy questions, 
and assistance with constituent concerns.”251  The Department of Home-
land Security’s version carries out similar duties in addition to “working 
with the White House and within the Executive Branch.”252  Agency heads 
have also established specific offices to manage communications and in-
formational exchanges with the President.  The Department of Commerce, 
for example, has an Office of White House Liaison charged with managing 
interactions with many of the President’s appointees.253 
By contrast, other agency heads have also chosen divisional allocations 
of specialized authority to obtain the same information.  Specifically, many 
will place political appointees across various substantive program areas — 
an institutional choice some have likened to a “merger” between political 
appointees and the more permanent bureaucracy of career staff.254  While 
many of these new positions were created by Presidents, agency heads 
have often had a role in the selection of appointees.  As David Barron ob-
serves, “because many of these new appointed positions are not formally 
for the President to make, it is possible that agency heads use them to 
augment their own capacity to formulate a semi-independent policy that is 
potentially counter to the White House.”255  Indeed, these lower-level ap-
pointees are frequently chosen for their alignment with the agency head’s 
regulatory vision.256 
In short, agency heads that prioritize particular kinds of information — 
say, political over scientific data — can increase the relative specialization 
of horizontal units within their agencies through either functional or divi-
sional forms.  Doing so can decrease the costs of processing such infor-
mation over time, especially when these specialized units exhibit increased 
economies of scale.  In other words, agency heads can access specialized 
information more cheaply by structuring their staff to reflect their longer-
term priorities — particularly when the net gains from such reorganization 
 251 See Office of Legislative Affairs, About the, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov 
/encyclopedia/office-legislative-affairs-about (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/5BR2-M3L6]. 
 252 See Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov 
/about-office-legislative-affairs (last updated Oct. 2, 2015) [http://perma.cc/76ME-YCPA]. 
 253 See OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DOO 15-18, OFFICE OF WHITE 
HOUSE LIAISON (1992), http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/dmp/doos/doo15_18.html [http:// 
perma.cc/JWV5-JNBE]. 
 254 Cf. Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 235, 244–45 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (discussing the President’s 
appointments); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of 
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1124 (2008) (same). 
 255 Barron, supra note 254, at 1128–29. 
 256 See id. 
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increase with staff size.257  As a result, agency heads can have more effi-
cient access to their preferred forms of information. 
3.  Separation. — Separation as a coordination strategy refers to the 
agency head’s ability to render certain determinations — either between 
internal organizational units, or between the agency and some external 
body — independent.  Separation “drops an imaginary curtain” between 
two sets of actors through various means such as restrictions on ex parte 
contacts and other prohibitions against participation and consultation.258  
To invoke a familiar illustration of the principle (albeit a statutory one), 
section 554(d) of the APA prohibits adversarial agency staff members in 
formal adjudicatory proceedings from “participat[ing] or advis[ing]” in fi-
nal decisions rendered by administrative law judges.259  Adversarial staff 
members are accordingly separated from administrative law judges.  
Separation is a decision to increase the flow of independently derived 
information to the agency head.  The strategy blocks particular information 
flows from occurring until an independent determination of some kind has 
been made — after which the agency head can process that information to 
make a final decision.  Separation can be either internal or external.  An 
agency head can separate organizational structures within an agency, that 
is, or between the agency and an outside body.  To illustrate, take design 
choices that various agency heads have made with respect to risk assess-
ments — studies of the likely adverse health effects of environmental haz-
ard exposure.260  Some agency heads have chosen to separate those re-
sponsible for preparing such studies from decisionmakers by placing each 
group into a distinct and autonomous entity within an agency.  Internally 
separate offices provide risk assessments for specific rules, programs, or 
agency-wide actions, while other offices subsequently evaluate the results 
and recommend regulatory options.  
For instance, at one point, the EPA’s Carcinogen Assessment Group 
(CAG) was independent from the risk management divisions of the 
EPA.261  The CAG was initially created in 1976 by EPA Administrator 
 257 It is also possible that specialization could increase coordination costs should it ultimately require 
greater internal transaction costs.  See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 29, at 986 (noting that 
“specialization is limited by the costs of coordination” since “[t]oo much specialization means that 
coordination of the specialized activities becomes difficult”). 
 258 Asimow, supra note 34, at 759.  
 259 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012); see also Asimow, supra note 34, at 761–62, 765. 
 260 See COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE 
PROCESS 18 (1983), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn 
=0309033497 [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT] (discussing the merits of 
“separating the analytic functions of developing risk assessments from the regulatory functions of 
making policy decisions,” id. at 2). 
 261 Id. at 105. 
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Russell Train as a separate body within the Agency’s Office of Research 
and Development that reported directly to its Assistant Administrator.262  
In 1979, however, Administrator Douglas Costle established a separate Of-
fice of Health and Environmental Assessment within the Office of Re-
search and Development — in which the CAG was now one of several 
risk assessment entities.263  As a result, CAG staff became “insulated from 
the day-to-day pressures of program offices.”264 
Alternatively, agency heads have also requested that risk assessments 
be developed or reviewed by entities formally outside the agency, while 
retaining inside the agency separate decisionmaking processes for how to 
regulate in light of those assessments.  For example, many agencies use 
standing advisory committees like the National Advisory Committee on 
Occupational Safety and Health or other outside independent expert panels 
such as various committees of the National Research Council (NRC).  The 
NRC is the operating unit for the advisory functions of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences265 and is made up of a number of ad hoc committees 
composed of recognized industry and governmental experts as well as aca-
demics.266  Importantly, agency heads retain the ability to reject or accept 
the conclusions drawn by the NRC.  The conclusions themselves are often 
independently reviewed within the agency after the reports are released.267 
Interestingly, some empirical work on the FDA suggests that agency 
heads strategically seek input from independent advisory committees to 
avoid blame when risks are uncertain.268  At the FDA, advisory commit-
tees can be created and established by the FDA commissioner, who can al-
so determine the committees’ meeting agendas as well as decide which 
drugs merit committee review.269  Data collected from 1985 to 2006 reveal 
that the FDA commissioner was eighteen to twenty-two percent more like-
ly to send priority rather than nonpriority drugs to committees for re-
view.270  Priority drugs are drugs with new formulations that have only 
been tested under experimental conditions.271  As a result, they are the 
drugs with the most uncertain risks.  The same data reveal that more 
pharmacologically complex drugs were eight to thirteen percent more like-
 262 Id.; see also Roy E. Albert, Carcinogen Risk Assessment in the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 24 CRITICAL REVS. TOXICOLOGY 75, 77, 79 (1994). 
 263 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 260, at 105. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 114. 
 266 See id. at 114–15. 
 267 See id. at 114. 
 268 See generally Susan L. Moffitt, Promoting Agency Reputation Through Public Advice: Advisory 
Committee Use in the FDA, 72 J.  POL. 880 (2010). 
 269 See id. at 883. 
 270 Id. at 886. 
 271 Id. at 884. 
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ly to receive advisory committee review.272  As such, “[t]wenty years of 
FDA advisory committee experience suggest the agency chooses to send 
the drugs with the most uncertain implementation profiles to its public ad-
visors.”273  The more uncertainty increases, in other words, the more likely 
it is for agency heads to employ external separation strategies.   
4.  Standardization. — In addition to structural hierarchies and separa-
tion techniques, agency heads can also lower their information-processing 
costs by standardizing their decisionmaking processes.  Indeed, the notion 
that information costs can be reduced in this manner is familiar in other 
legal arenas, such as contract274 and property law.275  The basic insight is 
that greater amounts of discretion require more time and resources to gain 
the requisite data needed to tailor and individualize each decision.  By re-
ducing the amount of discretion through a one-time investment aimed at 
generating standardized terms and options, agency heads can lower the fu-
ture information costs necessary to make an optimal decision.276  Put dif-
ferently, standardization “provide[s] shortcuts that enable individuals to 
identify the type of challenge they face efficiently, focus their attention on 
the kind of information needed for that sort of situation, and invoke an ap-
plicable rule of behavior swiftly.”277  Codifying such informational 
shortcuts, in turn, allows knowledge to be more cheaply communicated 
within the institution, thus transcending any individual’s agency-specific 
expertise.278 
Agency heads can standardize the information used in rulemaking deci-
sions in many ways, whether as rules, guidance documents, memoranda, 
operating procedures and manuals, among many other forms.279  Each of 
these choices has different implications and effects for agencies as well as 
 272 Id. at 886. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 
EMORY L.J. 1401, 1419 (2009). 
 275 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
 276 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1182. 
 277 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation As Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 414 (2006). 
 278 See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1144 (2007) 
(“Once knowledge is codified, standardized, and rendered explicit . . . it is no longer embedded in the 
individual, but ‘can be communicated from its possessor to another person in symbolic form, and the 
recipient of the communication becomes as much “in the know” as the originator.’” (quoting Sidney G. 
Winter, Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets, in THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: 
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION AND RENEWAL 159, 171 (David J. Teece ed., 1987))). 
 279 See Magill, supra note 40, at 877 (“Memos, circulars, guidebooks, press releases, interpretative 
rules, policy statements, and legislative rules can all be mechanisms by which an agency announces 
limits on its own discretion.”). 
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third parties.280  Legislative rules, for example, are generally applicable 
rules with binding, legal consequences — on the public, the courts, and the 
agency itself.281  By contrast, guidance documents are interpretive rules 
and statements of policy intended to clarify existing regulatory policies and 
legal interpretations.282  Finally, internal memoranda and manuals are more 
akin to management tools intended to help train and guide agency staff.283 
A relatively straightforward illustration of this coordination mechanism 
arises whenever agencies promulgate legislative rules interpreting the stat-
utes that they administer.  By promulgating such rules, agency heads can 
essentially standardize the ways in which their enforcement agents and 
other agency staff provide legal information within the agency and to third 
parties.  By tying its hands in this manner, the agency can also reduce the 
amount of legal uncertainty facing the agency through Chevron defer-
ence.284  Similarly, agency heads can also issue guidance documents out-
lining their current understandings of scientific issues, as the EPA has done 
recently regarding childhood cancer risks285 and the FDA has done with 
emerging nanotechnology issues.286  In doing so, these agency heads can 
provide nonbinding notice to regulated entities, and more relevantly here, 
information to their own internal staff and future agency heads, about the 
scientific expertise currently available within the organization. 
Analogous insights can also help to explain the behavior of agency 
heads who have increasingly standardized their approaches to CBA in re-
sponse to the heightened uncertainty presented by successful judicial and 
 280 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1437–
42 (2004). 
 281 See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932) (“When 
under this mandate the Commission declares a specific rate to be the reasonable and lawful rate for the 
future, it speaks as the legislature, and its pronouncement has the force of a statute.”). 
 282 See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing distinctions 
between interpretive and legislative rules); Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like — Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332–55 (1992) (providing examples of agency uses of nonlegislative policy 
documents). 
 283 See Anthony, supra note 282, at 1384.  
 284 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When, 
Chevron said, Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be administered by an executive 
agency, it is presumed that Congress meant to give the agency discretion, within the limits of 
reasonable interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be resolved.”). 
 285 See Notice of Availability of the Document Entitled Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 
70 Fed. Reg. 17766 (Apr. 7, 2005). 
 286 See Guidance for Industry: Considering Whether a Food and Drug Administration–Regulated 
Product Involves the Application of Nanotechnology; Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 36534 (June 27, 2014); 
Guidance for Industry: Assessing the Effects of Significant Manufacturing Process Changes, Including 
Emerging Technologies, on the Safety and Regulatory Status of Food Ingredients and Food Contact 
Substances, Including Food Ingredients that Are Color Additives; Availability, 79 Fed. Reg. 36533 
(June 27, 2014); Guidance for Industry: Safety of Nanomaterials in Cosmetic Products; Availability, 79 
Fed. Reg. 36532 (June 27, 2014). 
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presidential challenges.  In 2010, for example, the EPA Administrator is-
sued revised Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.287  Among oth-
er things, the revisions included new standardized methods for calculating 
baselines, as well as more detailed guidance on discounting and distribu-
tional effects.288  The EPA’s first version of this document was promulgat-
ed in 1983289 — shortly after President Reagan issued the first order re-
quiring executive agencies to engage in CBA.290  Other agencies like the 
Department of Transportation have issued official guidance regarding spe-
cific CBA issues, such as how to measure the value of statistical life.291 
In the wake of Business Roundtable v. SEC — which, recall, struck 
down an SEC rule as arbitrary and capricious for a deficient CBA292 — 
and other similar cases,293 numerous independent agency commissioners 
from the SEC to the CFTC have also issued their own guidance documents 
for economic analyses.294  Specifically, the SEC’s cost-benefit guidance 
“[e]xpressly equates the benefits of a rule with gains in economic efficien-
 287 NATL’S CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2010, updated May 2014), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa 
/eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf [http://perma.cc/XBT4-Y3VG]. 
 288 See Livermore, supra note 36, at 646. 
 289 See id. at 642; see also EPA Guidance, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://yosemite.epa 
.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/dcee735e22c76aef85257662005f4116/550c4984d3985754852577f800072d5e!opend
ocument (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7XWC-WKNC].  Prior to the 2010 revision, the 
EPA made several revisions to its 1983 document, most recently in 2000.  See NATL’S CTR. FOR 
ENVTL. ECON., supra note 287, at 1-1. 
 290 See Livermore, supra note 36, at 614.  
 291 The Department of Transportation in 2011 adopted a value of statistical life of $6.2 million (2011 
dollars).  See Memorandum from Polly Trottenberg, Assistant Sec’y for Transp. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., & Robert Rivkin, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Secretarial Officers & Modal 
Adm’rs, Re: Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in Departmental Analyses — 2011 
Interim Adjustment (July 29, 2011), http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files 
/docs/Value_of_Life_Guidance_2011_Update_07-29-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/KF9P-JZ4W].  
 292 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 293 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 294 See, e.g., Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation, SEC & the Office of 
the Gen. Counsel, SEC, to Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices, Re: Current Guidance on 
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemakings (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi 
_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z7RS-VLY3]; Memorandum from Dan M. 
Berkovitz, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n & Jim Moser, Acting Chief 
Economist, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, to Rulemaking Teams, Re: Guidance on and 
Template for Presenting Cost-Benefit Analyses for Commission Rulemakings (Sept. 29, 2010), 
reprinted in OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, AN 
INVESTIGATION REGARDING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION IN CONNECTION WITH RULEMAKINGS UNDERTAKEN 
PURSUANT TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT Ex-1 (April 15, 2011), 
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oig_investigation_041511.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VY87-BPBS]; see also Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of 
Regulations at Independent Regulatory Commission 5–6 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper, No. 
11–16, 2011), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-11-16_final 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/DZ7U-2PE4]. 
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cy,”295 which could include “enhanced competition, lower costs of capital, 
reduced transaction costs and elimination of market failures such as collec-
tive action problems.”296  In addition, it also requires rule-writing teams to 
clearly identify the proposed rule’s justification, explicitly define the base-
line against which to measure the proposed rule’s economic impact, identi-
fy and discuss reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule, and analyze the 
economic consequences of the proposed rule and the principal regulatory 
alternatives.297 
While the terms of the guidance document still leave rule-writing staff 
with substantial discretion, according to a former SEC senior official, 
“[t]he 2012 Guidance has in effect amended the micro-constitution of the 
SEC staff, elevating the economists to the status of a co-equal branch of 
the agency.”298  In other words, the guidance document has helped to 
standardize as well as prioritize the value of economic information to the 
SEC’s decisionmakers.  Indeed, this official also testified to a resulting 
change in the relationship between agency lawyers and economists — 
from “a stable dysfunctional equilibrium,” where economists stood at the 
sidelines, to one in which “economists [are] at the table from the beginning 
of each rule to the end.”299  By all accounts, these documents have also 
increased the consistency of scientific and regulatory analyses prepared by 
agency staff.300  Most importantly for present purposes, they have likewise 
decreased the informational costs for the SEC commissioners to make 
rulemaking decisions on the basis of economic considerations.  As a gen-
eral matter, by standardizing previously contested issues of scientific and 
economic policy, agency heads can more efficiently determine regulatory 
policy on these grounds without engaging in expensive internal delibera-
tions.  
5.  Procedures. — Beyond structural choices and standardization tech-
niques, agency heads can also implement procedural coordinating mecha-
nisms to ensure that certain kinds of information will be given higher pri-
ority than other kinds during the regulatory drafting process.  Depending 
 295 Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 YALE J. ON 
REG. 289, 328 (2013). 
 296 Id. at 328–29. 
 297 See Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation, SEC & the Office of Gen. 
Counsel, SEC, supra note 294, at 4. 
 298 Kraus, supra note 23, at 302. 
 299 Id. 
 300 See, e.g., id. at 302–03 (explaining how a “seemingly simple [guidance] document has focused 
and enhanced how the [SEC] and its staff approach economic thought and utilize the expert [economic] 
staff” (quoting Craig M. Lewis, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Econ. & Risk Analysis, Keynote 
Address at the Investment Company Institute 2014 Mutual Funds and Investment Management 
Conference (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech 
/1370541172162#.U8mLThZPX1g [http://perma.cc/K5TH-5C5G])); Livermore, supra note 36, at 645–
46 (noting that guidelines are part of a broader agency push to identify best CBA practices). 
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on the procedural form — whether a rule, guidance document, or operating 
manual — agency heads can essentially determine which internal interests 
will have access to a rulemaking decision, with varying degrees of en-
trenchment.  Two prominent examples of such coordination mechanisms 
are internal clearance and priority-setting processes.  Internal clearance 
processes grant certain offices or individuals within the agency sign-off au-
thority before the regulation can be approved by the agency head.  Priori-
ty-setting processes, in turn, ensure that certain regulations will receive 
more attention from the agency head, thus increasing the probability of the 
rule’s promulgation relative to others in the queue. 
(a)  Internal Clearance. — In response to changes in external uncer-
tainties, agency heads often impose or else revise internal clearance proce-
dures.  These procedures require particular individuals within an agency to 
sign off on a document to signal their approval.  Before promulgating offi-
cial documents like proposed or final rules, agency heads can require par-
ticular agency officials with the relevant expertise to review the draft be-
fore signing it themselves.  One purpose of these procedures is “to make 
sure that every administrative unit inside the government . . . contributes 
its special knowledge, point of view, and sympathy for its clientele to the 
final [rulemaking] product.”301  At the same time, however, agency heads 
can also manipulate these procedures to choose which offices or divisions 
should have a say in the regulatory development process, and when the in-
formation provided by that office or division should be considered, if at 
all.  
Recall that agency heads generally subdelegate the initial task of regu-
latory drafting to career staff within program offices.302  Analogous to leg-
 301 HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE 49 (1977) (emphasis omitted); see also Magill, supra note 40, 
at 886 (noting that agencies can self-regulate by “empower[ing] a large number of officials with sign-
off authority before a major action is undertaken”); Schlanger, supra note 39, at 94 (“Regardless of the 
impact on the document subjected to clearance, even the softest of clearance requirements ensures that 
each office asked to clear is kept informed of what is going on at other government offices, which has 
its own benefits.”). 
 302 See, e.g., EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220, at 25 (describing “[l]ead 
[o]ffice [d]elegation[s]” as those regulatory actions that are handled solely within the agency’s “lead 
office[]”); FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., RULEMAKING MANUAL 7 (2000) [hereinafter FHWA MANUAL], 
http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/FHWARulemaking%20Manual.pdf [http://perma.cc/3578-
X47Q] (identifying the “program office” as the “technical office responsible” for “[d]rafting rulemaking 
documents”); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 53 
(1975) (describing as the “most active” members in a regulatory work group “those representing the 
‘lead office’ or ‘office of primary interest’ — the office which first had the idea for the rule or has been 
assigned responsibility for it”); West, supra note 221, at 775 (defining “lead offices” as “the line units 
[within an agency] that have substantive, programmatic responsibility for the policies in question”); see 
also supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. 
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islative committees in terms of their jurisdictional scope,303 these “lead” 
offices usually contain the individuals within the agency with the most 
subject-specific expertise.  The Department of Transportation, for example, 
has multiple divisions that specialize in the regulation of federal highways, 
aviation, pipelines and hazardous materials, motor carriers, railroads, and 
maritime activities.304  Rule-writing staff responsibilities usually include 
assembling the myriad materials that comprise a rulemaking docket, from 
the regulatory text eventually codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
to the rule’s preamble, to any analyses required by statute or executive or-
der.305  After the team has completed the draft rule and assembled the rel-
evant materials, it must then guide the document through the agency’s in-
ternal clearance process. 
By strategically engineering these clearance procedures, agency heads 
can process information in ways that align with their individual priorities.  
In this sense, they can hardwire their preferences into the regulatory draft-
ing process itself.  First, agency heads can choose which functional or di-
visional offices must explicitly grant approval before the draft can pro-
ceed.306  An agency head particularly concerned with how Congress might 
react to her regulations — say, under conditions of divided government — 
can specify that the agency’s office of legislative affairs has clearance au-
thority.  In this manner, she can ensure that the agency’s political infor-
mation is brought to bear on the regulatory decision. 
An agency head seeking to ensure that cost-benefit considerations are 
adequately taken into account can also confer agency economists with 
sign-off power.  The Federal Trade Commission’s leadership, for instance, 
currently seeks the concurrence of its Bureau of Economics as well as its 
commissioners.307  Similarly, recall that the SEC’s commissioners recently 
granted the agency’s Chief Economist explicit clearance authority of eco-
 303 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside — An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 
908 (2013). 
 304 These divisions include, inter alia, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), 
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD).  Our Administrations, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http:// 
www.transportation.gov/administrations (last updated Apr. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/32MC-CY6N]. 
 305 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING 65, 81 (4th ed. 2011). 
 306 See Magill, supra note 40, at 882 (noting that an agency could “adopt a rule, for instance, that 
both the general counsel and the relevant program official have to consent to policy changes before a 
rule or enforcement action is initiated . . . [or] might even adopt a rule requiring consensus among all 
relevant program officers before any significant action is taken”). 
 307 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL §§ 7.3.5.2, 7.3.8.3, http://www.ftc.gov 
/sites/default/files/attachments/ftc-administrative-staff-manuals/ch07rulemaking.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/4GUB-Q55V].   
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nomic analysis during its internal rule review process.308  By contrast, the 
Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) review process does not re-
quire that its economists clear a regulation; rather, the FHWA administrator 
first requires concurrence from the agency’s program offices, then its legal 
division, its Legislation and Regulations Division, and, finally, the agen-
cy’s chief counsel.309  Similarly, a draft rule within the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) must secure the approval of a branch reviewer, the associ-
ate/deputy/chief counsels, the Assistant to the Commissioner, and Commis-
sioner before moving on to the Department of Treasury for final authoriza-
tion.310   
In addition to choosing which offices get a say during the clearance 
process, agency heads can also structure the ways in which internal dis-
putes between various offices are resolved, and by whom.  Generally 
speaking, those with sign-off authority do not usually possess hard internal 
vetoes in the sense that they can definitively stop the rulemaking from 
proceeding.311  However, they can internally delay the draft rules as they 
raise their objections and concerns about the draft.312  Should such disa-
greements persist, clearance procedures usually specify how these issues 
should be elevated in the agency hierarchy and which higher-level policy 
official should ultimately resolve the remaining disagreements.313 
To illustrate, at the EPA, if there is an internal conflict between the 
program office, an office of legislative affairs, and the legal counsel’s of-
fice about how to interpret an authorizing statute, a representative from 
each unit can brief the relevant policy official, who will then decide the 
interpretation with which to proceed.314  Under most circumstances, the 
EPA Administrator has specified that the deputy administrator should adju-
 308 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 22, at ii (“[T]he OIG found that the Commission 
has taken steps to improve its process for economic analysis by: (1) requiring RSFI economists to be 
involved in the three stages of the rulemaking process; (2) hiring economists with financial industry 
knowledge; and (3) formalizing the Chief Economist’s review and concurrence process.”). 
 309 See FHWA MANUAL, supra note 302, at 31. 
 310 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.6.8.4, http:// 
www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-001-006.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/78GX-
GPUN]. 
 311 See Schlanger, supra note 39, at 94 (“[O]ne government office ordinarily cannot authoritatively 
stop the issuance of a document by its sibling office.”).  
 312 Id. (“[I]t is possible to give an office assigned a clearance role something very close to that 
power, by structuring the conflict resolution procedure so that it is the operational office that needs to 
‘appeal’ a clearance denial.”). 
 313 The FHWA manual, for instance, explicitly states that the rulemaking team is responsible for 
“resolv[ing] issues or elevat[ing] issues to management for resolution.”  FHWA MANUAL, supra note 
302, at 8.  Similarly, the EPA provides that “[i]f workgroup members cannot agree, the issues of 
disagreement should be presented to management for resolution.”  EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS, supra note 220, at 34; see id. at 71 (discussing the process of informal and formal elevation 
of disagreements to management and other policy officials such as the Administrator). 
 314 See McGarity, supra note 37, at 81–82.  
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dicate the disagreement,315 though she allows for elevation to the Adminis-
trator for the most controversial issues.316  By comparison, the Commis-
sioner of the IRS specifies that the Associate Chief Counsel within a divi-
sion should usually resolve the dispute, though the matter could also be 
elevated to higher levels when necessary.317 
In this manner, agency heads possess substantial discretion to deter-
mine the processes through which a regulation is drafted and revised be-
fore it gets elevated for their final review and signature.  Not only can 
agency heads determine which offices or bureaus should (and should not) 
weigh in during the process, but also they can specify how conflicts among 
these offices are resolved and who within the agency can resolve them in 
the first instance.  Moreover, such mechanisms can promote internal ac-
countability by demanding that certain staff members take responsibility 
for particular aspects of a regulation, whether the supporting legal, eco-
nomic, or scientific analyses.  Accordingly, the power to implement and 
revise internal clearance procedures is an important coordination device 
available to the agency head. 
(b)  Priority-setting. — Agency heads, however, have limited time and 
resources.  Asdo career staff.  Thus, agency leaders must also impose pro-
cedures for how to prioritize particular regulations, when to release them, 
and which rules deserve the most internal attention.  Thus, another coordi-
nation mechanism available to agency heads is the ability to privilege cer-
tain kinds of regulations to ensure that informational resources are allocat-
ed accordingly. 
Indeed, about three-quarters of major rulemaking agencies currently 
employ some kind of internal priority-setting system.318  The EPA Admin-
istrator, for example, uses a three-tier approach to categorize the agency’s 
internal priorities.319  The first tier is designated for rules expected to have 
major economic impacts, provoke interagency conflicts and external con-
troversy, as well as “present[] a significant opportunity for the [a]gency to 
advance the Administrator’s priorities.”320  As a result, the first-tiering 
mechanism requires EPA program offices to learn about the preferences of 
the EPA Administrator and which regulatory actions she is likely to favor.  
 315 See Pedersen, supra note 302, at 57 (“By the nature of the way EPA is (dis)organized, really 
sticky issues are escalated at least to the [Deputy Assistant Administrator] level and maybe higher for 
resolution.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum to William F. Pedersen, Jr. from a senior 
EPA official (May 4, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal))). 
 316 See, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220, at 71 (noting that issues could 
ultimately be formally elevated to the Administrator, though doing so would be “unusual” except for 
the most significant rules). 
 317 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 310, § 32.1.6.3. 
 318 See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 305, at 131. 
 319 See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220, at 22. 
 320 See id. at 25. 
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The second tier, in turn, consists of less consequential rules that still re-
quire the attention of authoritative decisionmakers, while the third category 
only receives attention from the relevant program office.321 
In designing these systems, agency heads are able to highlight their 
most important regulatory goals in advance.  At the same time, however, 
some agency heads must also be able to adapt and respond quickly to ex-
ternal disruptions and uncertainties.322  Some leaders of agencies most 
likely to confront such contingencies have thus chosen priority-setting cri-
teria keyed to the degree of expected congressional or executive branch re-
sponse.  The Coast Guard within the Department of Homeland Security, 
for instance, scores regulations based “on the type and amount of external 
and internal interest (for example, congressional, judicial, White House, or 
DHS).”323 
By contrast, other agency heads prioritize criteria grounded in more ob-
jective risks, rather than immediate public fears.  The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s leadership, for example, currently scores its developing 
rules according to their likelihood for increasing safety and security, as 
well as their expected effectiveness.324  As a result, the commissioners 
may desire more scientific information when deciding how to give prece-
dence to certain projects on their regulatory agendas.  By implementing a 
priority-setting mechanism based on criteria such as safety and effective-
ness, these commissioners can coordinate their informational sources to 
ensure that such information is internally privileged.  This institutional 
choice may reflect the fact that the agency is headed by a multimember 
commission congressionally designed to be relatively shielded from more 
political forms of influence. 
* * * 
In short, agency heads faced with political, legal, economic, or scien-
tific uncertainties can employ a number of coordination mechanisms to re-
duce their internal information-processing costs.  First, they can place staff 
with the relevant expertise toward the top of the agency’s vertical hierar-
chy.  Doing so allows agency heads direct access to relevant information 
without costly filters through multiple layers of management.  At the same 
time, it also allows them to control and refine the kinds of information 
most valuable to them.  Alternatively, agency heads can encourage hori-
zontal specialization within the agency by organizing functional or divi-
sional offices of experts.  Grouping staff in this manner allows for greater 
 321 See KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 305, at 132. 
 322 See id. at 134. 
 323 Id. at 133. 
 324 Id. at 132–33. 
51 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
economies of scale and can also promote regulatory consistency.  Agency 
heads can also strategically separate information-providing sources from 
decisionmaking apparatuses to avoid blame for a policy’s potential conse-
quences or to solicit outside expertise.  Such coordination can also be 
achieved through standardization.  Standardization requires a one-time in-
vestment of resources by agency heads, which can then later decrease the 
informational costs for future regulations.  Agency heads can also selec-
tively impose coordinating procedures to govern clearance authority and 
priority-setting.  Such procedural choices can essentially fuse an agency 
head’s preferences into the regulatory drafting process.  
B.  Constraints 
While agency heads possess substantial organizational discretion due to 
the realities of resource-limited overseers, they must still operate within 
several constraints.  These constraints include the reorganization’s imple-
mentation costs for any given budget, as well as mandated design choices 
from Congress or the President. 
1.  Implementation Costs. — Administrative agencies are bureaucra-
cies, and bureaucracies are notoriously resistant to change.325  As sociolo-
gist Max Weber observed, the career incentives and training of civil serv-
ants usually orient them toward perpetuating the stability of their 
institutions, rather than embracing administrative innovations: “The indi-
vidual bureaucrat is, above all, forged to the common interest of all the 
functionaries in the perpetuation of the apparatus . . . .”326  In addition, 
civil servants usually possess various salary and tenure protections that are 
not directly tied to any measurable government output.327  As a result, 
their longer time horizons often promote the creation of routines and or-
ganizational norms that are difficult to modify without voluntary buy-in 
and resource-intensive retraining.328  Civil servants may also resist at-
tempts at top-down organizational reform, secure in the knowledge that 
their durations at the agency are likely to outlast that of the more fleeting 
political appointee. 
As a result, incoming administrative leadership seeking to restructure 
their agencies or implement new procedures often face substantial imple-
 325 See WILSON, supra note 31, at 221–32 (discussing how bureaucracies can resist adaption to 
innovation). 
 326 Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 337 (Craig Calhoun, et al. 
eds., 3d ed. 2012); see also id. at 328–338. 
 327 See RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND 
THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 7 (1994). 
 328 See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Comment, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential 
Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1189 (1994) (noting that thick 
“[o]rganizational norms and practices limit . . . the opportunities for significant changes in behavior, 
strategy, and internal agency structures”). 
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mentation costs.329  Depending on the agency head’s budget constraints, 
these implementation costs can be outcome-determinative.  As a practical 
matter, centralization, specialization, and separation strategies can require 
internal transfers of functions among existing career staff.330  These trans-
fers implicate a complex set of regulations and guidance documents prom-
ulgated by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).331  Compliance 
requires an investment of time and resources the agency head could devote 
to other activities.  OPM’s handbook for “agency leader[s] or manager[s]” 
contemplating such reorganization alone spans over one hundred pages.332  
The implementation of internal proceduralization and standardization ef-
forts is also costly.  Formulating such procedures and internal guidance 
documents can take months, even years, of internal discussions and negoti-
ations between agency heads and career staff.333  Path dependence further 
promises that such attempts will likely be expensive in terms of the staff 
meetings and documentation required to shift agency practices. 
Prior structural choices may have also fostered powerful constituencies 
within and outside of the agency that actively resist top-down changes.  
Congressional committees, White House entities, as well as powerful inter-
est groups, may have also developed their own relationships around the ex-
istence of certain agency offices or procedures.  They may therefore object 
to or even actively block attempts at internal administrative reform.  In-
deed, many “[s]ubordinate bureaus within the agency often represent en-
trenched policy orientations, which the administrator cannot entirely ne-
gate.”334  Bureaucratic inertia can thwart even the best-laid plans. 
Previous agency heads may have also entrenched their own clearance 
and priority-setting procedures through rules that require expensive pro-
cesses to modify or reverse.  Recall, for example, HHS’s rule published in 
the Federal Register that eliminated a previous exception that had allowed 
 329 See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 1, at 129. 
 330 See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., WORKFORCE RESHAPING OPERATIONS 
HANDBOOK 115 (2009), http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/workforce-restructuring 
/reductions-in-force/workforce_reshaping.pdf [http://perma.cc/CBR4-52QW] (defining “transfer of 
function” as “(1) [t]he transfer of the performance of a continuing function from one competitive area 
to one or more different competitive areas, except when the function involved is virtually identical to 
functions already being performed in the other competitive area(s); or (2) the movement of the 
competitive area in which the function is performed to another local commuting area”); see also id. at 
114 (defining “reorganization” as “[t]he planned elimination, addition, or redistribution of functions or 
duties in an organization”). 
 331 See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., supra note 330. 
 332 Id. at 3. 
 333 See, e.g., Kimbis, supra note 46, at 241–43 (discussing various planning retreats and meetings 
occurring over a number of years as part of the National Endowment for the Arts’ restructuring efforts). 
 334 See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 246 
(1984). 
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the FDA to avoid the need for clearance approval by the HHS Secretary.335  
The new rule now required the FDA to submit all “significant” regulations 
to HHS for oversight and approval.336  Because of the form in which it 
was issued, future changes to this internal clearance procedure would like-
ly require similar publication in the Federal Register.  Even decisions to 
revise coordinating mechanisms through operating manuals or guidance 
instead of published rules can consume a substantial amount of agency re-
sources.  Drafting such documents often requires numerous time-
consuming meetings and negotiations among otherwise busy political and 
career officials.337 
As a result, the expected benefits of particular intra-agency coordina-
tion mechanisms to an agency head must outweigh the potentially consid-
erable implementation costs in order to proceed.  This calculus itself may 
depend on the expected length of the agency head’s tenure.  Those agency 
heads who are quickly confirmed at the start of a presidential administra-
tion, for example, are more likely to invest the time and political capital 
necessary to impose or change a coordination mechanism, given that they 
are more likely to benefit from the longer-term expected payoffs.  While 
implementing such strategies may be expensive at first, once established, 
they could eventually yield greater net savings in information-processing 
costs.  
2.  Mandatory Design Requirements. — Congress and the President can 
also engage in the organizational design of agencies.  In doing so, they can 
constrain the agency head’s choices regarding how and whether to central-
ize authority, demand internal specialization, separate decisionmaking from 
information gathering, standardize decisions, and implement internal pro-
cedures.  These legislative and executive requirements can be agency-
specific or else apply across an array of agencies.  Consider, for example, 
the proliferation of “chief officer” statutes across various agencies.338  
With these, Congress has mandated a number of specialized senior posi-
 335 See Raising the Level of Rulemaking Authority of the Food and Drug Administration in Matters 
Involving Significant Public Policy; Response to Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 26,052 (May 11, 
1981). 
 336 Id. 
 337 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Not Revisiting Official Discount Rates: Institutional Inertia and the 
Social Cost Of Carbon, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 2014, at 547, 547–49 (describing 
“institutional inertia” that often prevents revisions to internal agency guidance documents). 
 338 CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32388, GENERAL MANAGEMENT LAWS: 
MAJOR THEMES AND MANAGEMENT POLICY OPTIONS 26–29 (2004) [hereinafter BRASS, GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT LAWS]; CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30795, GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT LAWS: A COMPENDIUM 4 (2004); DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
122–23 (2012), http://permanent.access.gpo.gov 
/gpo37402/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf [http://perma.cc/P7RV-TYYS].  
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tions to helm particular agency functions such as financial management,339 
information technology,340 human resources,341 and procurement.342  
These legislative choices constrain the ability of agency heads to determine 
the full array of internal functions or forego particular kinds of infor-
mation. 
In addition to demanding certain kinds of functional specialization, 
some of these statutes also compel the centralization of authority.  To illus-
trate, the laws governing chief financial and information officers require 
that these officers report directly to the agency head.343  Thus, at the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission, for instance, the Chief Financial Officer’s 
line of authority flows directly to the agency’s commissioners.344  By con-
trast, statutes establishing chief human capital and chief acquisition offic-
ers leave those officers’ internal reporting relationship to the discretion of 
the agency head.345  Thus, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA)’s chief human capital officer, for example, reports to the As-
sociate Administrator for Mission Support Directorate, as opposed to the 
NASA Administrator directly.346  In this manner, Congress can either re-
quire the centralization of authority or else leave it to the agency head’s 
discretion. 
Numerous other examples of the legislative determination of internal 
coordination abound.  Congress has, for example, required the separation 
of expert judgments in certain agencies through statutorily mandated advi-
sory committees.  The law governing the CFTC, for example, demands the 
establishment of the Energy and Environmental Markets Advisory Com-
mittee.347  By contrast, the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) 
can create advisory committees as “he may deem appropriate to assist in 
the performance of his functions.”348  Congress has also revised internal 
clearance procedures by imposing “mandatory consultation” requirements 
 339 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 901–903 (2012); see also BRASS, GENERAL MANAGEMENT LAWS, supra 
note 338, at 28 tbl.1. 
 340 See 40 U.S.C. § 11315 (2012); 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2012); see also BRASS, GENERAL 
MANAGEMENT LAWS, supra note 338, at 28 tbl.1. 
 341 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1402; see also BRASS, GENERAL MANAGEMENT LAWS, supra note 338, 
at 28 tbl.1. 
 342 See 41 U.S.C. § 1702; see also BRASS, GENERAL MANAGEMENT LAWS, supra note 338, at 28 
tbl.1. 
 343 31 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1); 44 U.S.C. § 3506(a)(2)(A). 
 344 NRC Organization Chart, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.nrc 
.gov/about-nrc/organization/nrcorg.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) [http://perma.cc/HL6Q-3T2Y]. 
 345 See BRASS, GENERAL MANAGEMENT LAWS, supra note 338, at 28 tbl.1. 
 346 Office of Human Capital Management,  NASA ONLINE DIRECTIVES INFO. SYS., http:// 
nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/npg_img/N_PD_1000_003E_/OHCM_April2015.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/L94V-E26M].  
 347 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(15)(A) (2012); see also LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 338, at 122. 
 348 42 U.S.C. § 7234 (2012); see also LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 338, at 122. 
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whereby agencies must confer with other agencies before taking certain ac-
tions.349  According to Professors Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, these re-
quirements can effectively “function as a veto” since ignoring the results 
of the consultation have legal ramifications.350 
When statutes are otherwise silent or ambiguous, the President can also 
determine internal agency structure and process.351  One prominent exam-
ple is the creation and evolution of “Regulatory Policy Officers” (RPOs) 
within executive branch agencies.  In 1993, President Clinton first estab-
lished RPOs to help improve the rulemaking process and allowed agency 
heads the discretion to designate RPOs from among the agency staff.352  
President George W. Bush, however, modified the position’s scope and 
function through his own executive order, which was later revoked.353  
While RPOs could previously be career civil servants, Bush now required 
agency heads to choose RPOs from among the agency’s presidential ap-
pointees.354  In doing so, he effectively reorganized agencies’ internal hier-
archies, elevating his own appointees’ role in the regulatory process and 
augmenting presidential control.  Furthermore, the executive order also 
prohibited rulemakings from commencing without RPO approval and no 
longer explicitly required RPOs to report directly to agency heads.355  
Both changes constitute further presidential revisions to agencies’ internal 
rulemaking processes. 
In this manner, both Congress and the President can impose organiza-
tional restrictions that constrain the extent to which agency heads them-
selves can implement internal coordination mechanisms.  Agency heads 
can restructure their agencies to process internal information only insofar 
as legislative and executive restrictions allow them to do so.  As a final 
observation here, while the congressional and presidential design of agen-
cies have been well-studied elsewhere,356 the dynamics of intra-agency 
coordination invite greater scholarly attention to the interactions between 
 349 Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1158. 
 350 Id. 
 351 See generally PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY (2d ed., rev. 1998); 
LEWIS, supra note 5; Moe & Wilson, supra note 5. 
 352 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 86–91 (2012). 
 353 See Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 5(b), 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010). 
 354 Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 5(b), 3 C.F.R. at 193. 
 355 See id. § 4(b), 3 C.F.R. at 192.  Compare id., with Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 
645. 
 356 See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and 
Agency Discretion, 38 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 697 (1994); William G. Howell & David E. Lewis, Agencies 
by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095 (2002); Timothy Muris, Regulatory Policymaking at the 
Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884 (1986); see 
also sources in supra note 3. 
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externally and internally imposed structures and processes.  Interesting re-
search questions — extensions not pursued here — include the extent to 
which legislative innovations such as inspectors general, advisory commit-
tees, and ombudsmen can be explained as efforts to dislodge specific 
agency-head organizational choices.  Another worthwhile project might 
examine how mandatory versus discretionary coordination mechanisms — 
say, advisory committees required by Congress versus those established by 
agency heads — systematically differ in terms of composition and recom-
mendations, if at all. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
This Part now takes a step back to consider the implications of intra-
agency coordination for the administrative state more broadly.  Specifical-
ly, it considers the potential dynamic effects on political and legal account-
ability, as well as on internal agency expertise and efficiency.  Against this 
backdrop, this Part concludes by suggesting some resulting avenues for re-
form. 
A.  Political Accountability 
At its core, administrative law aims to legitimate the delegation of au-
thority from politically accountable legislators to the unelected bureaucrats 
working in federal agencies.  Central to this project is the premise that 
when high-level agency heads are called before Congress in oversight 
hearings or sued in federal court, they are responsible for the vast bureau-
cracies they ostensibly lead.357  Greater intra-agency coordination — 
whether in the form of more centralization, specialization, separation, 
standardization, or proceduralization — could increase agency-head ac-
countability in the political arena, provided that such coordination efforts 
are transparent. 
Consider, for example, the public reaction to the decision of President 
George W. Bush’s newly appointed FDA Commissioner, Mark McClellan, 
to internally reorganize the FDA.  Among other changes, McClellan sought 
to move the oversight responsibility for regulating therapeutic biotech 
drugs from the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research 
(CBER) to the Agency’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER).358  He defended his organizational decision before Congress dur-
 357 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261 (2006) (“When a litigant sues the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, or Congress summons the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration to a hearing, 
both assume that these high-level officials have effective control over the bureaucracies that they 
manage.”). 
 358 See Jeffrey L. Fox, FDA Appointee Faces Angry, Demoralized Staff, 20 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1065, 1065 (2002). 
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ing a Senate committee hearing, claiming that it was intended to “improve 
overall management” and take advantage of “more consistency and econ-
omies of scale” within the two divisions.359  In addition to legislative scru-
tiny, McClellan faced public criticism as well.360  Some close observers 
accused him of harming small biotechnology companies who would suffer 
from the lack of guidance as a result of the shift.361  Others worried that 
the transfer of responsibility would compromise the robust protocols 
CBER had established for approving novel technologies.362  In this man-
ner, FDA nominee Mark McClellan became the face of the FDA’s internal 
restructuring. 
McClellan’s intra-agency coordination decisions became a matter of 
political debate because they were made public and disclosed in advance.  
As it currently stands, however, administrative agencies vary widely in the 
extent to which they document and release their internal operating proce-
dures, clearance chains, and updated organizational charts.  On one end of 
the spectrum, for instance, the IRS has a highly formalized manual availa-
ble online that details its internal regulatory drafting and clearance proce-
dures.363  Similarly, both the EPA and the FHWA also provide extensive 
public documents describing their regulatory development and priority-
setting mechanisms in detail, alongside their organizational charts.364 
On the other end of the transparency divide, however, are agencies like 
the FCC, which provides little public information about its internal rule-
making process.  While the FCC Chairman in 2010 issued a public memo-
randum designed “to formalize a process” for its internal units to regularly 
consult with each other,365 at least one current commissioner has decried 
the agency’s “unnecessarily opaque” internal rulemaking procedures — 
particularly in the context of the FCC’s high-profile net-neutrality proceed-
ings.366  As a result, this commissioner has called upon the FCC to “con-
sider, adopt, and post official rules of procedure” that would eventually be 
codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.367 
 359 Id. 
 360 See id. 
 361 See id. 
 362 See id.   
 363 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 310, § 32.1.6. 
 364 See generally EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 220; DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
FHWA MANUAL, supra note 302. 
 365 Intra-agency Coordination, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.fcc 
.gov/encyclopedia/intra-agency-coordination [http://perma.cc/C6JZ-8PUC].  
 366 See Michael O’Rielly, Fixing Flawed and Non-Existent “Editorial Privileges”, OFFICIAL FCC 
BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/fixing-flawed-and-non-existent-editorial-
privileges [http://perma.cc/MJ2V-ML5D]. 
 367 Id. 
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Transparency not only increases the political accountability of the 
agency head’s managerial decisions, but also can contribute to greater con-
sistency and uniformity across the agency’s rules.  Transparency further 
facilitates greater public participation by revealing the real sites of deci-
sionmaking power within the agency and mechanisms through which to 
contest the exercise of such power.368  Thus, legislative or executive 
branch reforms aimed at requiring the disclosure of both agency structure 
and internal procedure would yield many salient benefits.  The APA, as 
amended and recodified by the Freedom of Information Act369 (FOIA), 
currently demands that agencies publish in the Federal Register “descrip-
tions” of their “central . . . organization.”370  According to the Attorney 
General’s Manual on the APA, this provision requires each agency to 
“list[] its divisions and principal subdivisions and the functions of 
each.”371  Numerous courts have refused to enforce this provision, howev-
er, unless the parties before them could show that they were adversely af-
fected by the agency’s failure to publish.372  As a result, agencies have not 
been required to publish their organizational charts or internal delegations 
of authority absent a showing of specific harm.373 
Congress could amend this statute, however, to override these judicial 
decisions and instead render enforceable the publication requirement for 
agency organizational descriptions without a showing of adverse effect.  It 
could take this opportunity to add language requiring the publication of in-
ternal rulemaking procedures as well.  This legislative amendment could 
further subject both publication requirements to FOIA’s enforcement provi-
sions.374  These enforcement provisions were intended to reverse the APA’s 
previous restriction of access to agency materials to “persons properly and 
 368 See Metzger, supra note 42, at 1893. 
 369 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 370 Id. § 552(a)(1) (“Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register 
for the guidance of the public . . . descriptions of its central and field organization . . . .”). 
 371 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 20 (1947); see also Sean Croston, It Means What It Says: Deciphering and 
Respecting the APA’s Definition of “Rule”, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 27, 44–47 (2013).  
 372 New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Goodman, 605 F.2d 870, 
887–88 (5th Cir. 1979); Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1970). 
 373 In practice, many agencies publish their “[d]escriptions of the agency’s legal authorities, public 
purposes, programs, and functions” as well as “[l]ists of officials heading major operating units” in the 
United States Government Manual.  1 C.F.R. § 9.2(a) (2015).  Regarding FOIA, however, the Attorney 
General has opined that the information in the manual “should not be regarded as a substitute for, but 
merely a useful supplement to, the requirement to ‘currently publish’ such information in the Federal 
Register.”  See RAMSEY CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MEMORANDUM 
ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967), 
reprinted in 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 263, 274 (1968). 
 374 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (“Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the 
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a 
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”). 
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directly concerned” with the information.375  To the contrary, FOIA does 
not require those requesting access to agency records to show why they 
need such information.  Rather, agencies must disclose requested infor-
mation to any person for any reason unless explicitly exempted.376  Denial 
of such information establishes standing for suit.377 
To further spur disclosure, the President could also issue an executive 
order requiring the publication of organizational charts and internal rule-
making procedures for executive agencies.  This order could encourage in-
dependent agencies to do so as well.  In addition, or alternatively, the 
OMB or OIRA could formulate disclosure guidance for agencies pursuant 
to recent open government initiatives.378  To the extent they possess the 
relevant discretion by statute and executive order, agency leaders could 
then be more publicly responsible for any perceived failures to manage 
their internal procedures and staff effectively. 
While the transparency prompted by these measures could yield ac-
countability-enhancing benefits, disclosure requirements pose potential 
drawbacks as well.  As an initial matter, such requirements could prevent 
agency heads from pursuing valuable internal reforms for fear of the costly 
interest group involvement that might result.  They could also chill the 
candid internal conversations required to address sensitive political and 
management issues.379  Protracted public battles and FOIA litigation could 
occupy resources the agency head would rather spend advancing the agen-
cy’s mission.380  Such interest group participation, in turn, may be skewed 
towards better-funded lobbyists who work at cross-purposes with the agen-
 375 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404§ 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946), amended by 
Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54. 
 376 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975). 
 377 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989); John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Comment, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1228 n.60 (1993) 
(“When an agency wrongfully denies an individual’s FOIA request, that particular individual has 
suffered injury in fact under Article III and has standing to sue in federal court to redress that injury.”). 
 378 See President Barack Obama, Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 
26, 2009); Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. 
Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9WP-36BR].  For examples of such 
guidance documents, see Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Information & 
Regulatory Affairs, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/clarifying-regulatory-requirements_executive-
summaries.pdf [http://perma.cc/3435-QHZ2]; Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for 
Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 17, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-04.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/H8WD-HD9H]. 
 379 See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1166–67 (2010). 
 380 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 907 (2006) (“[D]isclosure 
requirements also undeniably raise the fiscal costs of government.”). 
60 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
cy heads’ goals.381  Consequently, transparency obligations may freeze into 
place structures and processes that would otherwise benefit from flexibility 
or experimentation.  A reduction in overall agency effectiveness may re-
sult. 
Relatedly, a transparency mandate could also further drive underground 
the real “folkways” of influence — the informal norms of conduct — 
within the agency.382  Indeed, it would be naive to claim that the inner 
workings of complex bureaucracies could be captured neatly in charts or 
guidelines.  To the contrary, management decisions necessarily require ex-
ercises of judgment tailored to the personalities and culture of various 
teams at a given point in time.  Thus, requiring agencies to make their in-
ternal processes public may encourage the production of organizational 
charts or other documents that are opaque or otherwise misleading.  For all 
of these reasons, transparency is not a panacea for the failures of agency 
heads to be held accountable for their organizational decisions.  At the 
very least, however, it may help to foster a much-needed public debate 
about the consequences of alternative institutional choices. 
B.  Efficiency and Expertise 
While transparent intra-agency coordination mechanisms could help 
promote political and legal accountability, such mechanisms could also 
pose potential tradeoffs with other administrative desiderata such as effi-
ciency and the incorporation of technical expertise. 
1.  Efficiency. — By definition, intra-agency coordination mechanisms 
decrease the net information-processing costs for knowledge the agency 
head values.  While initial implementation costs may be substantial, these 
mechanisms, once implemented, decrease the resources necessary for the 
agency head to acquire the information required to reach a rational conclu-
sion.  From the perspective of the agency head, intra-agency coordination 
is likely to increase efficiency by lowering the costs necessary to make a 
decision.383  Consequently, for any given budget constraint, greater coor-
dination helps the agency head pursue regulatory (or deregulatory) goals 
that she prefers. 
Whether such coordination is efficient from a broader societal perspec-
tive, then, depends on whether one believes the outcomes pursued by the 
 381 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial 
Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013); Wendy Wagner et. al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110–13 (2011). 
 382 Cf. Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms 
and Legislative Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064, 1064 (1959) (defining “folkways” as 
“unwritten but generally accepted and informally enforced norms of conduct”). 
 383 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1181 (characterizing “decision costs” as “relate[d] to 
efficiency” (emphasis omitted)). 
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agency head are desirable, since coordination can help to reduce the costs 
necessary to achieve those outcomes.  Put differently, determining whether 
greater coordination is socially efficient requires an evaluation of the ex-
tent to which the ends that an agency head attempts to achieve are the cor-
rect ones, whether grounded in welfare-maximization or some notion of 
the “public interest,” however defined.384  Of course, what those desired 
ends should be in the administrative state is a notoriously contentious 
question.  Perhaps one believes that a duly appointed agency head should 
be free to pursue whatever goals she prefers, even if nakedly political, as 
long as she stays within statutory bounds.385  Others would likely argue 
that agency heads have more robust duties.386  As a result, those that disa-
gree with the objectives of specific agency heads or otherwise believe they 
should be better cabined should advocate for the kinds of congressional 
and presidential constraints that would reduce the agency head’s organiza-
tional discretion. 
2.  Expertise. — Relative to a baseline of no coordination, agency head 
attempts to coordinate internal actors are likely to increase the likelihood 
of undue political interference with expert information.  Agency heads may 
centralize their authority or design their clearance procedures to bypass 
scientists or other policy professionals within the agency, signing and issu-
ing regulations that are ill-informed at best and motivated solely by parti-
san ends at worst.  Indeed, stories of high-level interference with staff sci-
entific judgments abound — from Republican and Democratic 
administrations alike.387 
 384 See SIMON, supra note 31, at 258 (“It can be seen that the criterion of efficiency as applied to 
administrative decisions is strictly analogous to the concept of maximization of utility in economic 
theory.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for Government Actions, 
39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141 (1998). 
 385 See Watts, supra note 81. 
 386 See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 
121 (2006) (“Agencies also are bound by a duty of fidelity to their statutory mandates, and duties of 
care and loyalty to their statutory beneficiaries.”); Metzger, supra note 42, (proposing that courts and 
political actors can identify some “constitutional line” that violates the constitutional duty to supervise). 
 387 See, e.g., CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005); TODD WILKINSON, 
SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICIANS’ WAR ON NATURE AND TRUTH (1998); Jody Freeman & 
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54–64.  
One example was the controversy over the actions of the Department of the Interior’s Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, who was appointed by President George W. Bush to oversee the 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s decisions about listing particular endangered and threatened species and 
designating critical habitats.  See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: ON ALLEGATIONS AGAINST JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS 2 (2007) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE REPORT]; Holly 
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1604 
(2008).  An inspector general’s report found that the Deputy Assistant Secretary had regularly called 
field staff and “bull[ied] them into producing documents” that reached results sought by the Assistant 
Secretary.  INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra, at 4.  The official resigned shortly after the report’s 
release.  See Doremus, supra, at 1605.  Similar accusations have dogged President Barack Obama’s 
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Of course, influence by a political appointee is not always illegitimate.  
To the contrary, such oversight should arguably be embraced in a legal sys-
tem such as ours that empowers the executive branch to determine policy 
when the underlying statutes are otherwise ambiguous.388  Where to draw 
the line between legitimate and illegitimate influence is not a straightfor-
ward inquiry.389  Some familiar conceptual categories, however, can be in-
structive.  Professor Kathryn Watts, for example, draws from civic republi-
can theory to suggest that appeals to “public values” should be permissible 
categories of political influence, while those grounded in mere “naked 
preference[s]” should not be.390  In other words, regulatory policies should 
not be legitimated by reference to horse-trading and partisanship, but ra-
ther should be justified by reference to the public interest more general-
ly.391  Watts acknowledges that such tests are necessarily imprecise,392 but 
these formulations may nevertheless serve as useful poles against which to 
evaluate the consequences of alternative coordination mechanisms in fact-
specific contexts. 
At the same time, however, note that agency heads who value expert 
information as a basis for regulatory decisionmaking could also choose co-
ordination mechanisms to privilege that expertise.  Take, for example, FDA 
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg’s 2014 efforts to reorganize the FDA 
through centralization and specialization.  Commissioner Hamburg is a 
noted doctor and scientist.393  To some observers, her reorganization ef-
forts represented an “attempt to [make the FDA] become more specialized 
and able to address increasing scientific and regulatory complexity.”394  
tenure, including reports of political appointees interfering with damage assessments to the Everglades 
and minimizing the environmental harms stemming from oil and gas exploration projects.  See Tom 
Hamburger & Kim Geiger, Scientists Expected Obama Administration to Be Friendlier, L.A. TIMES 
(July 10, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/10/nation/la-na-science-obama-20100711 
[http://perma.cc/3WW4-VCQC].  
 388 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); see also 
supra notes 141–151 and accompanying text. 
 389 See Watts, supra note 81, at 56. 
 390 Id. at 53.  See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 391 Watts, supra note 81, at 53; see also id. at 53–54. 
 392 See id. at 56 (“[T]rying to define what sorts of political influences should be viewed as legitimate 
and which should be viewed as illegitimate is not an easy task that can be summed up with a precise 
test.”). 
 393 See Nicholas Obolensky, Note, The Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011: Too Little, Too 
Broad, Too Bad, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 887, 925 (2012) (characterizing Hamburg as “an 
experienced medical doctor, scientist, and public health executive” (quoting Commissioner’s Page, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://web.archive.org/web/20150315035455/http://www.fda 
.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/default.htm (archived Mar. 15, 2015)).  
 394 Alexander Gaffney, Major Overhaul of FDA Planned in Bid to Become More Specialized, REG. 
AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view 
/article/4595/#sthash.qotc7Enm.dpuf [http://perma.cc/E5VC-SAQ6]. 
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One significant change was her creation of a deputy commissioner for 
medical products and tobacco within the Office of Commissioner.395  Its 
first occupant was Dr. Stephen Spielberg, a former dean of Dartmouth 
Medical School.396  The move sought to “provide high-level coordination 
and leadership” to the agency’s centers dealing with drugs, biologics, med-
ical devices, and tobacco products.397 
In this manner, centralization can be used to place experts close to the 
top of the agency hierarchy and allow them to better influence regulatory 
policy.  Creating a more specialized position also helps to augment the role 
of expertise in internal decisionmaking.  Because intra-agency coordination 
serves the preferences of specific agency heads and reflects how much 
they value expertise in the regulatory process, the net effects of particular 
mechanisms will ultimately be an empirical question, hopefully informed 
by the analyses here. 
C.  Judicial Oversight 
While requiring greater transparency of intra-agency coordination 
mechanisms could augment agency head accountability through political 
channels, and legislative and executive constraints on organizational dis-
cretion could better foster efficiency and expertise, a distinct issue is the 
extent to which such mechanisms should be subject to judicial review.  In 
general, courts have been “reluctant” to police agency structure and pro-
cess against claims of dysfunction or poor design.398  Indeed, the legal ba-
sis for judicial intervention in agency coordination practices is currently 
tenuous.  As Professor Gillian Metzger explains, executive branch supervi-
sion is “largely excluded” from traditional tenets of constitutional and ad-
ministrative law.399  Specifically, she points out, courts have generally re-
fused to incorporate the actual functioning of agencies into constitutional 
doctrines of standing, non-delegation, and government-officer supervisory 
liability, among others.400 
 395 Hamburg Reorganizes Commissioner’s Office, Adds Deputy Commissioner, 19 No. 7 FDA 
ADVERT. & PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSL. 8 (Sept. 2011). 
 396 Id. 
 397 Id. 
 398 See Gillian E. Metzger, Annual Review of Administrative Law — Foreword, Embracing 
Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1367 (2012); see also Kagan, supra note 
67, at 2269 (“[C]ourts incline instead toward enforcing structures and methods of decisionmaking 
designed to enable or assist other actors . . . to influence administrative actions and policies.”). 
 399 Metzger, supra note 42, at 1859; see also id. at 1846 (defining “administration” as “the running 
or managing of an organization or activity” including “internal organization and structure” and “intra-
agency . . . coordination”); see id. at 1871–73 (discussing administrative law exclusions). 
 400 See id. at 1859–70. 
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As for administrative law, the APA allows review only for “final agen-
cy action[s]” that result in identifiable harms.401  Consequently, litigants 
can only challenge specific agency actions as opposed to the more general 
structures or processes that resulted in the action.402  Administrative law’s 
hesitancy to police agency inaction further forestalls the ability of courts to 
intervene in systemic management failures.403  Furthermore, rules regard-
ing “agency organization, procedure, or practice” are not subject to notice-
and-comment and are thus exposed to less public scrutiny.404  Because 
such rules lack a robust public record, litigants may find it difficult to 
bring arbitrary-and-capricious challenges against them. 
While Metzger compellingly argues that courts should invoke a consti-
tutional duty to supervise in “extreme” circumstances, such as cases in-
volving a complete lack of coordination resulting in widespread or 
longstanding harms,405 worries about the wisdom of direct judicial en-
forcement nevertheless persist in more common situations.  Chief among 
them are the institutional competence and separation-of-powers worries 
that Metzger readily acknowledges.406  Judges are not well-positioned to 
assess the relative merits of different agency structures and processes.407  
Not only do judges usually lack sufficient managerial experience, but also 
they lack access to empirical data that might shed light on the comparative 
effectiveness of different organizational forms.  Equally disconcerting is 
the likely absence of judicially manageable standards for identifying ade-
quate agency coordination as well as the difficulties of formulating reme-
dial actions.408  Perhaps for these reasons, courts have been deferential to 
agency-head judgments of how to manage their organizational resources, 
especially when such decisions are not fixed by statute.409  
Indeed, one of the most compelling rationales mitigating against judi-
cial entanglement in agency design is potentially highlighted by the ac-
count offered here: intra-agency coordination decisions are ultimately po-
litical determinations.  They are political in the sense that they often track 
the preferences and priorities of agency heads amidst extant uncertainties.  
 401 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see also id. § 702; Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Metzger, supra note 42, at 1872. 
 402 See Metzger, supra note 42, at 1872. 
 403 See id. at 1871–73. 
 404 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 405 Metzger, supra note 42, at 1907; see id. at 1907–08. 
 406 Id. at 1843 (acknowledging that “concerns about judicial role and competency are real”). 
 407 Id. at 1843, 1906. 
 408 Id. at 1906–07. 
 409 See id. at 1872 (referencing Justice Scalia’s declaration that individuals “cannot seek wholesale 
improvement of this program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls 
of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally made” (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)). 
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They are also political in that they represent how these leaders prioritize 
and trade off among competing sources of information.  Inviting courts to 
upset this balance not only confuses the judicial function, but also threat-
ens to upset the equilibrium against the constraints imposed by other polit-
ical actors such as Congress and the President.410  These other actors are 
electorally accountable in a way that courts are not.  They also already en-
gage in ongoing study, oversight hearings, and supervision from which 
they can arguably make more informed organizational choices.411  For 
these reasons, Metzger’s suggestion that the political branches may be bet-
ter situated to enforce a constitutional duty to supervise may be her most 
promising.412 
Perhaps more desirable than direct judicial policing, then, is the judicial 
acknowledgment of intra-agency coordination as a means of reinforcing 
political oversight.413  Courts have already demonstrated receptivity to this 
role.  Most famously, the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corp.414 
refused to grant Chevron deference to a statutory interpretation contained 
in a tariff classification ruling letter, partially on the grounds that such let-
ters could be issued at various ports-of-entry without centralized supervi-
sion from the agency’s headquarters.415  While the majority’s rationale did 
not center on this observation — focusing instead on indicia of congres-
sional intent416 — it nevertheless recognized the institutional difference 
between centralized and decentralized legal conclusions as a potential basis 
for deference. 
Justice Scalia in his dissent took up this line of reasoning more force-
fully.  Specifically, he advocated for a deference regime that would simply 
look to whether the interpretation is “authoritative” in the sense that it 
“represents the official position of the agency.”417  Because the custom let-
ter’s interpretation in Mead had been ratified by the General Counsel of 
the Treasury, in his view, that interpretation “represent[ed] the authoritative 
view of the agency” and therefore Chevron deference was appropriate.418  
 410 See supra section II.B.2. 
 411 See Metzger, supra note 42, at 1927. 
 412 Id. at 1927–32. 
 413 See id. at 1913 (“[J]udicial involvement often may be limited to acknowledging the existence of a 
constitutional duty to supervise, with direct enforcement left to the political branches.”); id. at 1905–12. 
 414 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 415 See id. at 233–34 (2001); Metzger, supra note 42, at 1973; Magill & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 
1062–63. 
 416 See id. at 229–31. 
 417 Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For a similar argument, see David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, 
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 204  (“We contend that the deference 
question should turn on a different feature of agency process, traditionally ignored in administrative law 
doctrine and scholarship — that is, the position in the agency hierarchy of the person assuming 
responsibility for the administrative decision.”). 
 418 Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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One implication of this approach is that it would create incentives for 
agency heads to engage in greater intra-agency coordination by privileging 
those interpretations that have been directly authorized by the agency head. 
Extending these insights further, another way in which courts might 
acknowledge intra-agency coordination while primarily leaving its evalua-
tion to political actors is to grant the interpretation of ambiguous statutes 
governing agency design Chevron deference.419  Because such deference is 
grounded in both the superior expertise and political accountability of the 
agency,420 organizational decisions that reflect agency head priorities may 
be prime candidates.  There may also be a doctrinal basis for only extend-
ing such deference when agency heads have followed interpretive proce-
dures that foster “fairness and deliberation.”421  As a result, the potential 
for deference may encourage agency heads to make their organizational 
choices more transparent, through procedures that desirably invite public 
participation and input. 
In this manner, the judicial recognition of an agency’s organization and 
internal procedures would better match the practical realities of bureaucrat-
ic decisionmaking as well as the political nature of agency design.422  
More broadly, it could also create positive incentives for agency heads to 
take ultimate responsibility for administrative actions, instead of subdele-
gating them secretly to subordinates.  By fostering doctrines that recognize 
the extent to which agency heads are attempting to coordinate their internal 
operations, courts should recognize that agencies operate according to so-
phisticated internal structures and decisionmaking processes.  These fac-
tors, in turn, can serve as proxies for characteristics such as accountability 
or expertise that judges otherwise often attempt to address in an institu-
tional vacuum. 
CONCLUSION 
Administrative law’s tendency to treat the agency as a black box has 
obscured a number of important questions about the actual determinants of 
agency structure and process.  Current accounts of internal agency dynam-
ics often focus on congressional, presidential, or judicial influences on 
agency actors without adequately considering how an appointed agency 
 419 See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text. 
 420 See Kagan, supra note 67, at 2373–74. 
 421 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
 422 See Metzger, supra note 42, at 1842 (noting the “deeply troubling disconnect between the 
realities of government and constitutional requirements imposed on exercises of governmental power”); 
Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an 
Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 810 (2001) (“The anthropomorphic tendency to treat 
agencies as if they were a single human actor is particularly distracting and distorting when one is 
analyzing a medium that the constituent elements of complex institutions use to speak to each other.”). 
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head may mediate between these external pressures.  This view tends to 
neglect the ways in which agency leadership can filter and prioritize 
among these often-conflicting exogenous demands through bureaucratic 
design. 
By contrast, this Article has sought to develop more general insights in-
to the unique ways in which an agency head’s organizational choices can 
influence rulemaking outcomes.  Specifically, agency heads faced with po-
litical, legal, economic, and scientific uncertainties can employ a number 
of coordination mechanisms designed to reduce their internal information-
processing costs.  These tools could include the centralization of internal 
oversight, the specialization of functions and divisions, the separation of 
decisionmaking and analyses, the standardization of information, as well as 
the implementation of procedures governing clearance authority and priori-
ty-setting within the agency.  
One hypothesis that results from this analysis is that, holding all else 
constant, increases in exogenous levels of uncertainty will prompt internal 
reforms that promote the more efficient transmission of privileged infor-
mation to the agency head.  Thus, one might expect to see an increase in 
the number of intra-agency coordination mechanisms at agencies uniquely 
affected by that change.  Another possibility is that the partisan affiliation 
of agency heads may also help to explain bureaucratic variation, reflecting 
changes in internal informational priorities.  Empirical work might test 
these hypotheses against a broader array of agencies by coding agencies’ 
respective organizational forms and procedures.  The account here has 
provided some motivating examples that could help inform this research 
agenda. 
While this study has attempted to open further lines of conversation be-
tween those working in administrative law and other disciplines, its scope 
has been necessarily limited.  Many other potentially rich veins of inquiry 
remain.  For example, others may want to extend the themes explored here 
to contexts beyond rulemaking: to look at, say, how agency heads coordi-
nate adjudication, enforcement, grantmaking, or permitting, and whether 
these dynamics differ and why.  Multimember commissions and boards al-
so raise questions not explored here about the ways in which multiple 
agency heads introduce different organizational dynamics and complicate 
decisions about internal design.  Are there, for instance, different voting 
rules for structural or procedural changes, and should there be?  Moreover, 
further attention might also be paid to the ways in which agency heads 
contract out their informational needs to external actors as opposed to ful-
filling them in-house.  There may be fruitful parallels here to the analo-
gous decisions made in private firms. 
Finally, as a normative matter, intra-agency coordination also raises a 
number of important questions about the socially optimal scope of agency-
head control.  This Article has argued that, at a minimum, such coordina-
tion mechanisms should be publicly disclosed.  Congress or the President 
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could impose such requirements directly, or they could be fostered through 
judicial doctrines that reward the agency head for taking responsibility for 
facets of agency design.  Such efforts are particularly important amidst the 
modern observation that broad legislative delegations, partisan polariza-
tion, and limited executive resources have increasingly called into question 
the extent to which politically accountable actors can realistically monitor 
their appointed agency heads.  For these reasons, administrative law must 
evolve, as it always has, to adjust to these new realities — by further turn-
ing to the ways in which agency actors can and do govern themselves. 
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